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ABSTRACT 
 
Metacognitive functions play a key role in understanding which elements 
might lead a person with severe mental disorder to commit violent acts against 
others. Indeed, understanding internal states such as thoughts, emotions, desires, 
fears and goals, both their own and those of others and differentiating between 
them, is needed in order to guide behaviour towards the resolution of 
interpersonal conflict. This is a fundamental aspect of affronting the risk of 
committing aggressive acts.  
The aims of the study were the following: (a) to investigate the differences 
between patients with a poor metacognitive functioning and patients with a good 
metacognitive functioning in relation to history of violence; (b) to explore the 
differences between patients with a poor metacognitive functioning and patients 
with a good metacognitive functioning in relation to other important aspects 
potentially involved in aggressive behaviour such as personality traits, anger, 
impulsiveness, hostility and emotion recognition; (c) to investigate the differences 
between patients with a poor metacognitive functioning and patients with a good 
metacognitive functioning in relation to aggressive behaviour displayed by 
patients during the one year follow-up; (d) to analyse the predictors of aggressive 
behaviour and evaluate if the metacognitive functions associated with other 
investigated aspects are related to aggressive behaviour during the one-year 
follow-up.  
The sample included 180 patients: 56% outpatients and 44% inpatients, the 
majority were male (75%) with a mean age of 44 (+9,8) years and half of them had 
a history of violence. The sample was split into two groups: Poor Metacognition 
(PM) group and Good Metacognition (GM) group, according to MAI evaluation 
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scores. 
The PM patients reported a history of violence more frequently than GM 
patients (considering MAI total score), and in particular patients with poor 
monitoring, differentiating and decentering. Furthermore, PM patients showed 
less ability in emotion recognition and more frequently paranoid and narcissistic 
personality traits compared to GM patients. Concerning hostility, impulsivity and 
anger, no significant differences were found, except for ‘Negativism’ (i.e., BDHI 
subscale) that was higher in PM patients. During the 1-year follow-up, no 
differences between the PM group and the GM group in aggressive behaviours 
(verbal, against objects, self-aggression, against people) were found. The strongest 
predictors of aggressive behavoiur were: Borderline and Passive-Aggressive 
personality traits, history of violence, anger and hostility. The metacognitive 
functions alone did not predict aggressive behaviour, but metacognitive functions 
interacted with hostility manifested through direct and indirect aggression (two 
BDHI subscales) and with angry reaction through aggressive behaviour (one 
STAXI-2 subscale) in predicting aggressive behaviour. Indeed, these aspects 
predicted aggressive behaviour only in PM patients and not in GM patients.  
This study leads to important conclusions: (a) certain aspects closely related 
with violence (e.g., hostility, anger) are predictive of aggressive behaviour only in 
patients with poor metacognition, thus good metacognition is a protective factors; 
(b) poor metacognition is associated with history of violence, which in turn 
increases the risk of committing aggressive behaviour. For this reason and 
considering that research in this field is still very limited, further studies are 
needed to deepen the role of metacognitive functions in relation to aggressive 
behaviour and to investigate whether psychotherapy focused on metacognitive 
functions is effective to prevent and/or reduce interpersonal violence. 
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RIASSUNTO 
 
Le funzioni metacognitive svolgono un ruolo chiave nella comprensione di 
quali elementi potrebbero indurre una persona con gravi disturbi mentali a 
commettere atti violenti contro altre persone. Risulta, infatti, essenziale 
comprendere gli stati interni quali pensieri, emozioni, desideri, paure e obiettivi, 
sia propri che altrui, ed essere capaci di differenziarli tra loro, per poter guidare il 
proprio comportamento verso la risoluzione dei conflitti interpersonali. Per tale 
ragione, questo aspetto diviene fondamentale nell'affrontare il tema del rischio di 
violenza, cercando di comprendere ciò che discrimina persone con disturbi mentali 
che commettono agiti aggressivi e pazienti con gli stessi disturbi che non 
commettono tali atti. 
Gli obiettivi dello studio erano i seguenti: (a) indagare le differenze tra 
pazienti con uno scarso funzionamento metacognitivo e pazienti con un buon 
funzionamento metacognitivo in relazione alla storia di violenza; (b) esplorare le 
differenze tra pazienti con uno scarso funzionamento metacognitivo e pazienti con 
un buon funzionamento metacognitivo in relazione ad altri importanti aspetti 
potenzialmente coinvolti in comportamenti aggressivi come i tratti della 
personalità, la rabbia, l'impulsività, l'ostilità e il riconoscimento delle emozioni; (c) 
investigare le differenze tra pazienti con uno scarso funzionamento metacognitivo 
e pazienti con un buon funzionamento metacognitivo in relazione al 
comportamento aggressivo manifestato durante l’anno di follow-up; (d) analizzare 
i fattori predittivi del comportamento aggressivo e valutare se le funzioni 
metacognitive associate ad altri aspetti indagati sono correlate al comportamento 
aggressivo agito durante il follow-up. 
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Il campione è costituito da 180 pazienti: 56% ambulatoriali e 44% 
residenziali, la maggior parte erano maschi (75%) con un'età media di 44 anni 
(+9,8) e metà di essi aveva una storia di violenza. Il campione è stato diviso in due 
gruppi: il gruppo Scarsa Metacognizione (PM) e il gruppo Buona Metacognizione 
(GM), in base ai punteggi ottenuti nella valutazione dell’intervista metacognitiva 
(MAI). 
I pazienti con scarsa metacognizione hanno riportato più frequentemente 
una storia di violenza rispetto ai pazienti con buona metacognizione 
(considerando il punteggio totale MAI), e in particolare i pazienti con scarsa 
metacognizione nelle specifiche funzioni di monitoraggio, differenziazione e 
decentramento. Inoltre, i pazienti con scarsa metacognizione presentavano meno 
abilità nel riconoscimento delle emozioni e più frequentemente tratti di personalità 
paranoidi e narcisistici rispetto ai pazienti con buona metacognizione. Per quanto 
concerne l'ostilità, l'impulsività e la rabbia, non sono state riscontrate differenze 
significative tra i due gruppi, ad eccezione del "Negativismo" (sottoscala del 
BDHI), che era più alto nei pazienti con scarsa metacognizione.  Anche nel caso dei 
comportamenti aggressivi (verbali, contro oggetti, auto-aggressivi, contro le 
persone) manifestati durante l’anno di follow-up, non sono emerse differenze 
significative tra i due gruppi. I dati rivelano che i predittori del comportamento 
aggressivo sono i seguenti: tratti di personalità borderline e passivo-aggressivi, 
storia di violenza, rabbia e ostilità. Le funzioni metacognitive da sole non 
predivano il comportamento aggressivo, ma esse interagivano con le seguenti 
dimensioni in tale predizione: l'ostilità manifestata attraverso aggressioni dirette e 
indirette (due sottoscale del BDHI) e le reazioni rabbiose agite tramite il 
comportamento aggressivo (una sottoscala della STAXI-2). Infatti, questi aspetti 
emergevano come predittori dei comportamenti aggressivi solo nei pazienti con 
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scarsa metacognizione e al contrario, non risultavano più predittori nei pazienti 
con buona metacognizione.  
Questo studio porta a importanti riflessioni: (a) alcuni aspetti strettamente 
correlati alla violenza (ad esempio, ostilità, rabbia) sono predittivi di 
comportamenti aggressivi solo in pazienti con scarsa metacognizione, facendo 
risutare la buona metacognizione come fattore protettivo; (b) la scarsa 
metacognizione è associata alla storia di violenza, la quale a sua volta aumenta il 
rischio di commettere comportamenti aggressivi. Per tale ragione e considerando 
che la ricerca in questo campo è ancora molto limitata, sono necessari ulteriori 
studi al fine di approfondire il ruolo delle funzioni metacognitive in relazione al 
comportamento aggressivo, e per indagare se la psicoterapia orientata al 
miglioramento delle funzioni metacognitive può rivelarsi efficace nel prevenire 
e/o ridurre la violenza interpersonale . 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to investigate and understand which elements might lead a person 
to commit violent acts against others, the ability of each individual to recognize 
and verbalize thoughts, feelings and behaviours and link them to each other, plays 
a key role. These skills include those belonging to their own state and those of 
other individuals, and finally the ability of distinguishing them as different mental 
states. These dimensions are well explained by several theoretical approaches: the 
theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), mentalization (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2004), metacognition (Semerari et al., 2003; Wells, 2000), and so on. 
The current study focuses on people with severe mental disorder. Indeed, 
the literature indicates that these people are more likely to act violently compared 
to the general population. Nevertheless, not all people with severe mental illnesses 
commit violent acts (Torrey, 200). Consequently, the core aim is to investigate 
whether poor metacognitive functions as a potential risk factor in people with 
severe mental disorders who have committed aggressive behaviour compared to 
people with the same disorders but who did not commit such acts.  
It is clear that the ability to understand internal states such as thoughts, 
emotions, desires, fears and goals, both their own and others and to differentiate 
them, is needed in order to guide behaviour towards resolution of interpersonal 
conflicts. Indeed, this is a fundamental aspect, concerning the risk of committing 
aggressive acts. 
In the first chapter the concept of metacognition is described, first through 
the presentation of the different approaches that dealt with this construct, then 
through the deepening of the theoretical approach of metacognition used in the 
present research. 
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The second chapter describes through the literature, the topic of 
metacognition in patients with mental disorders and specifically metacognition in 
patients who conducted violent behaviour. The last chapter presents the research 
on metacognitive functions in patients with severe mental disorders and history of 
violence (half of the sample), while comparing a group of patients with poor 
metacognition to a group of patients with good metacognition, and then 
monitoring aggressive behaviour of all the patients during 1-year follow-up. 
Finally, discussion of the data, research limitations and clinical implication are 
argued. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE METACOGNITION 
 
1.1 Metacognition: a multidimensional construct for various theoretical 
approaches  
The concept of metacognition refers to an individual’s ability to recognize 
internal states and consequently, to build a complete and complex representations 
of themselves and others, including all elements of human experience, thoughts, 
emotions and behaviour. Furthermore, the same concept is used to describe how 
such representations guide the action of individuals, especially in difficult 
situations. 
These skills, depending on the context in which they are studied, are 
described by various theoretical constructs that focus on one or more aspects of 
these complex and crosswise skills that are present in each individual's daily 
experience. In order to have a more comprehensive picture of this construct and to 
avoid lexical and conceptual confusion, the main approaches concerning the study 
of these skills have been described in detail.  
The Theory of Mind (ToM; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 
1978) was developed in relation to developmental disorders in pathologies such as 
Autism, Asperger's syndrome, etc.. In this case, the ToM focuses on recognizing 
the mental states of others, in particular referred to cognitive attributes. 
According to Baron-Cohen, the main characteristic of Autism would be a 
sort of blindness to mental content. A person with Autism has deficits in 
perceiving the existence of mental states in other people, and therefore this person 
appears incapable of giving a mentalistic explanation of social interactions. ToM's 
abilities consist of the functioning of an innate component of the cognitive system 
that corresponds to the neurobiological maturation of a specific brain area, aimed 
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at understanding mental states (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Leslie, 1987). In Autism, 
this maturation could already be compromised during the early stages of life, or in 
more advanced periods. This condition would explain the symptomatic 
heterogeneity of the autistic syndrome, which includes both children totally 
isolated from the world, and individuals with good intellectual abilities, such as 
those affected by Asperger's syndrome (Leslie, 1987). 
A similar explanation has been proposed for schizophrenia disorders. 
According to Frith (1992), patients with schizophrenia have similar problems to 
those of autistic patients, due to ToM malfunction. Frith (1992) noted however, 
that the development of people with schizophrenia appears completely normal 
until the first psychotic episode. At the moment of onset, there is degeneration of 
neuronal populations in the orbit-frontal cortex (Frith et al, 1992). Frith suggests 
that delirium and hallucinations are effects of trying to give meaning to one's own 
and others’ events and thoughts, after having lost the ability to represent and link 
them. 
In explanation of these deficits, ToM is considered an "all-or-nothing" 
phenomenon: if present, it allows normal functioning of the skills related to the 
attribution of mental states. Whereas when absent, it causes difficulties in social 
interaction.  
Mentalization (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004) implies the attribution of meaning 
to one's own and others’ actions, based on intentional mental states such as 
desires, feelings and beliefs. Giving sense to what is in the mind allows one to 
understand his/her and others’ mental states, a fundamental ability that converges 
in the development of self-representation. This theory refers both to conscious and 
unconscious or pre-conscious processes. It is also strictly bound to the attachment 
theory (Bowlby, 1988), since this construct places the development of these skills in 
the primary relationships and in the early stages of life.  
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Good child development would be based on the caregiver's mirroring 
abilities of the child's mental states, in an "emphasized" and contingent manner, 
i.e., centered on the mental states experienced by the child during a specific 
moment (Bowlby, 1988). This feedback allows the child to perceive him/herself as 
a thinking entity/body with his/her own mental states, modulating his/her 
positive and negative emotions. The deviations from this evolutionary pathway 
could lead the individual to develop itineraries towards the psychopathology of 
mental disorders (Bowlby, 1988). In this direction, metallization involves a careful 
analysis of the circumstances in which action takes place, of previous behaviour 
patterns and of experiences to which the individual has been exposed. 
Alexithymia (Helmes, McNeill, Holden & Jackson, 2008; Taylor Bagby & 
Parker, 1991; Vanheule, 2008) indicates the difficulty to experience, recognize and 
describe emotions through words (above all ones own). Therefore, this inability 
leads people to physically express their emotions (through physical pain or self-
aggression or aggressive behaviour), and also to create confusion between bodily 
sensations and emotional states. Emotions are manifested across physiological, 
motor-behavioural and cognitive-experiential dimensions and are expressed 
through a very complex form of interpersonal communication. 
People with alexithymia especially lack cognitive-experiential components 
and interpersonal communication of emotions. The physiological and motor-
behavioural levels remain without a conscious, cognitive and verbal elaboration. 
Furthermore, individuals with this deficit fail to use interpersonal relationships in 
emotional regulation, and the privation of social sharing prevents identifying 
emotions. Indeed, alexithymia is considered a disorder of affective regulation 
(Taylor et al., 1991). 
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Most psychoanalytic theories place the origin and structure of these skills in 
the first years of a child's life, based on their relationship with a caregiver (Bion, 
1962; Grotstein, 1986; Kohut, 1971; Main, Kaplan & Cassidy 1985; Winnicott; 1965). 
Social Cognition studies (Bruner et al., 2007; Couture, Penn & Roberts, 2006) 
deal with processes through which people acquire information from the 
environment, interpret, store and recover them from memory. These processes aim 
to understand their social world and to organize behaviour in order to regulate 
social interactions.  
Social cognition is an interpersonal and reflective approach (Higgins & 
Bargh, 1987) that emphasizes cognitive processes in the social psychology field. 
People are characterized by the need of "knowing" reality, in large part made up of 
other people, in order to orientate their behaviour in an adaptive way to their 
environment. Social cognition investigates the way in which social information is 
organized in memory, considering many daily stimuli and limited resources of 
individuals. For this reason, the cognitive system would be controlled by a 
principle/rule "to obtain the maximum result with the minimum effort". 
According to this concept, knowledge is based on the need to select information, 
through targeted classification processes. Therefore, individuals use "heuristics", or 
shortcuts of judgment, which allow them to decide even in the absence of 
sufficient data. Attributions of causality, social categorizations, heuristics of 
thought are the main themes of interest of social cognition. 
Finally, the Metacognition theory, developed by Wells (2000; 2009), 
describes this skill as the aspect of mental functioning that controls attentive and 
thought processes, i.e., a set of factors that rules the evaluation and control/check 
of knowledge processes. These factors can be divided into beliefs, experiences and 
strategies. According to Wells’ theory, metacognitive beliefs perform a useful 
function only if are utilized sparingly, otherwise, instead of regulating thoughts 
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and emotions, they deregulate them because they lead to the harmful prominence 
of conscious activity.  
The Wells' model indicates three levels of mental functioning. (a) First level: 
rapid and automatic cognitive processes that are chaotically developed all together 
(organized in parallel), which produce general negative or positive emotional 
evaluation (or at a level more slightly sophisticated fear, anger, joy). (b) Second 
level: conscious processing of thoughts (sequentially organized) based on a certain 
logical order, i.e., transparent and detailed elaborations (the person knows why 
he/she thinks of something). (c) Third level: knowledge stored in long-term 
memory in a metacognitive form.  
In the present research, the explanatory model of metacognition used is that 
developed by the Third Center of Cognitive Psychotherapy (Carcione et al., 2008; 
Semerari, Carcione, Dimaggio, Nicolò & Procacci 2007; Semerari et al., 2012; 2014), 
as it is the best choice for the aims of the study. This approach defines 
metacognition as a complex system, composed of several functions in interaction 
between themselves, but also partially independent. This model differs from 
previous ones, which consider metacognition as a unique function, present or 
absent, or a function with several (hierarchic) levels but closely interconnected and 
non-independent. Moreover, this approach includes several dimensions 
considered by other theories only in a fragmented and partial way, such as ToM, 
alexithymia, social cognition. Furthermore, neuroscience studies show data that 
favors multifunction conception, highlighting specific aspects of metacognition 
(self-awareness and understanding of others’ mental states), relatively 
independent from each other but interconnected through functional networks 
(Mitchell, 2006; Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004). 
In addition, the metacognitive construct developed by Third Center of 
Cognitive Psychotherapy explains metacognitive functions by dividing abilities 
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that represent their own internal states (cognitive, emotional and motivational) 
and those regarding the understanding of others’ internal states. Finally they 
consider how such representations guide behaviour in solving interpersonal 
problems. 
Thus, this approach is able to identify and distinguish skills that might be 
essential in the risk of committing violence, such as the difficulty to understand 
and express one's own emotions on the one hand, and to understand others’ 
mental states and their intentions on the other. This could lead to maladaptive 
management of interpersonal relationships and the consequent risk of violence as 
a resolution of conflict. 
 
1.2 Metacognition: definition according to the model of the Third Center of 
Cognitive Psychotherapy (Rome)  
Metacognition, according to Third Center of Cognitive Psychotherapy 
(Carcione et al. 2008; Semerari et al. 2007; 2012; 2014), refers to a broad set of 
cognitive and affective skills, which allow people to identify mental states, to 
reason them and to ascribe them to themselves and others. These skills allow us to 
recognize why a person reacts psychologically based on regularities and personal 
constructs over their lifespan. 
Two ideas guided this metacognition research programme (Carcione et al., 
2008; Semerari et al., 2003). The first was that patients during psychotherapy 
sessions were unable to think in terms of mental states – i.e., metacognitive 
disorders – and this impacts treatment. Indeed, it was more difficult to plan 
treatment for people incapable of describing their own goals or emotions and with 
problems that make sense of therapists’ words and intentions. Therefore, 
metacognition appears to be a variable necessary to undertake any type of 
psychotherapeutic treatment, but it is impaired in those patients who ought to 
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derive the greatest benefit. Thus, it is both a prerequisite for treatment and at the 
same time, a therapeutic goal. 
The second idea was that the problem was not the same for all patients. 
Certain patients have serious difficulties translating their somatic states into 
affective language (“It’s as if I had a continuous cramp in my stomach”) and 
explaining the causes and motivations for their actions and states (“Today I’ve 
been in a bad mood; the moon must be against me”), while others have few 
problems in this area but were unable of distinguishing intrusive thoughts (“My 
colleagues are persecuting me”, “I’m being forsaken by everybody”) from the real 
state of things.   Cognitive science provided the tools which support and prove that 
metacognition consists of specific facets that together constitute a system, which is 
in some ways composed of a set of modules, i.e., parts of the mind specialized in 
processing particular information. (Nichols & Stich, 2000) 
The Third Center of Cognitive Psychotherapy operationalized the term 
metacognition as follows (Carcione et al., 2008; Semerari et al., 2007; 2012; 2014): 
Metacognition is a set of skills necessary for: a) identifying mental states and 
ascribing them to oneself and others on the basis of facial expressions, somatic 
states, behaviour and actions; b) reflecting on and reasoning about mental states; c) 
using information about mental states to decide, solve problems or psychological 
and interpersonal conflicts, and master subjective suffering. 
Therefore, this definition includes:  
a) The awareness of being an individual distinct from others and experiencing 
self-generated thoughts and emotions, thus thinking of oneself as an intentional 
agent. The awareness that others can influence one’s own thoughts and affect them 
through advice, dialogue or behaviour, but that others cannot dictate one’s own 
ideas and affect or insert them in one’s mind.  
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b) Identifying mental states and cognitive and affective processes. For example, 
identifying one’s own emotional state or perceiving that one’s actions are driven 
by a need, desire or intention; evaluating correctly one’s memory; deducing others’ 
emotions or intentions from facial expressions or behaviour; 
c) Reflecting on, reasoning about mental states; grasping the links between 
mental events and behaviour, pinpointing similarities in one’s reactions to events, 
distinguishing the subjectivity of one’s own point of view from external reality, 
distinguishing between different categories of representation (perceptions, 
memories, dreams, fantasies, etc.) and handling them correctly; constructing 
coherent narratives to explain variations in mental states over time and making 
sense of potential contradictions;  
d) Using psychological knowledge purposefully and intentionally to adjust 
action and modify plans and strategies as necessary, when events and contexts 
evolve; managing psychological problems and resolving conflicts, using strategies 
consistent with one’s goals and mastering subjective suffering. 
What this definition immediately makes clear is that metacognition is a 
conscious reflective process, in which psychological information is used 
knowingly and intentionally. This definition excludes defensive automatisms. 
Individuals under stress may abuse alcohol, eat too much or resort to physical 
exercise in an automatic manner, without being aware that these strategies are 
aimed at reducing mental suffering. Similarly, automatic actions aimed at eluding 
a feared situation, such as avoiding taking a bus in the case of panic attacks, are 
not necessarily metacognitive actions, unless a person is aware of his/her strategy 
and explicitly says or thinks: “I get too tense when I take the bus and so I avoid it”. 
Another key aspect is the distinction between true metacognition and a sort 
of “pseudo-metacognition” (Carcione et al., 2008; Semerari et al., 2003). In their 
daily lives, individuals constantly perform pseudo-mentalistic acts. They might, 
	
	
21	
for example, speak about their angry partner, saying things such as “because he’s a 
nervous type”, thus using a generic personality trait as a motivation without 
explaining what “being a nervous person” means. Or they might use stereotypical 
descriptions of behaviour: for example, saying that an adolescent abuses alcohol 
“because adolescence is a turbulent period of life involving a lot of stupid 
behaviour”.  
Another pseudo-mentalistic act is the generic description of others, without 
detailed explanations of a specific person’s way of functioning and reacting under 
specific environmental conditions. For example, people use pseudo-metacognition 
when they resort to general theories - such as “we live in a selfish society”, 
“foreigners don’t want to integrate in this country”, “men don’t want to get 
involved in looking after relatives” or “women change their mood without reason” 
to explain others’ actions (Carcione et al., 2008; Semerari et al., 2003). The 
individuals activate metacognitive functions when they try to process information 
which is: a) specific, b) obtained in a particular moment, c) related to a precise 
intra-psychical or interpersonal context, and d) related to episodes occurred within 
defined space and time boundaries.  
Metacognition differs from simple “insight”, i.e., the awareness of one’s 
emotions and thoughts and the ability to place them in personal history. Indeed, 
metacognition is a form of “applied insight” (Carcione et al., 2008; Semerari et al., 
2003). Through metacognitive functions, people can use their psychological 
knowledge and reasoning about their own and others’ mental states to; solve 
problems, master subjective suffering, settle conflicts with others, negotiate their 
desires and goals on the basis of an understanding of themselves and others, and 
apply this knowledge to appropriate strategies. Moreover, metacognition is an 
essential social life skill, which allows an ongoing regulation of relationships and 
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guides one’s behaviour based on their own and others’ mental states (Carcione et 
al., 2008; Semerari et al., 2003; 2007; 2012; 2014).   
Therefore, it is clear that a good metacognitive functioning promotes an 
adaptive resolution of interpersonal problems in people, whereas poor 
metacognitive functioning brings bad management of conflict that could lead a 
person to perform different types of aggressive behaviour, such as a maladaptive 
strategy to face difficulties. 
 
1.3 Metacognition in clinical practice 
Dysfunctions in metacognition are associated with low social functioning, 
low quality of life, symptoms of several mental disorders and they seem to predict  
worse treatment responses (Carcione et al., 2011; Lysaker, Outcalt & Ringer 2010; 
Lysaker et al., 2011a; Ogrodniczuk, Piper & Joyce, 2011; Semerari et al., 2007).  
Clinical observations have found that, even in less serious illnesses than  
autism and schizophrenia, impaired metacognitive functions can help explain the 
persistence of psychical suffering, existential difficulties and cases of failure to 
respond to treatment in other pathologies as well, such as Personality Disorders 
(PDs) (Dimaggio, Nicolo, Semerari & Carcione, 2013; Dimaggio & Stiles 2007; 
Fonagy, 1991), Mood Disorders (Allen, Bleiberg, Haslam-Hopwood, 2003; Inoue, 
Yamada & Kanba, 2006; Wolf, Brune & Assion, 2010), Eating Disorders (Olstad, 
Solem, Hjemdal & Hagen, 2015; Skarderud, 2007) and Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorders (Fonagy, 2004; Liotti, 2006). A lack of contact with their mental states 
prevents people from being able to access information about thoughts and 
emotions that underlie behaviour. This makes it difficult for them to understand 
their own reactions and the factors driving their actions, and also causes the same 
difficulty for an interlocutor. These in turn result in problems in interaction, 
empathy and building shared plans.   
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 In cognitive psychotherapy, patients are constantly encouraged by 
their therapists to reflect on their inner states, explore points of view different from 
their own interpretation schemas, and they are encouraged to experiment 
techniques for tackling and solving problematic states. Therefore, metacognitive 
skills are required and if lacking, they hamper the whole treatment process and 
cause intra-psychical and interpersonal problems.  
At the same time, improvement of metacognitive abilities constitutes the 
main goal of psychotherapy, which in particular allows personal improvement. 
Poor metacognition, for example, makes it difficult to: (a) understand internal 
signals telling us that we are tired, tensed, energetic, etc.; (b) imagine the relational 
causes behind our emotions and behaviour; (c) deduce motivation driving others’ 
actions and on the basis of this information, carry out action consistent with our 
own goals; (d) decode facial expressions; (e) distinguish between fantasy and 
reality; (f) utilise information we have on mental states to comprehend others.  
Consequently, therapists could have difficulty in properly identifying 
emotions and thoughts, even when they ask specific and repeated questions. Such 
patients also have difficulty understanding their therapist’s intentions and 
building a cooperative relationship based on a problem-solving attitude and on 
shared plans (Dimaggio & Stiles, 2007).  
 A series of clinical observations describe metacognitive dysfunction 
in the Personality Disorders’ (PDs) field; low general self-reflective skills and 
difficulties in integrating are features common to the various PDs (Bateman and 
Fonagy 2010; Bateman, O'Connell, Lorenzini, Gardner & Fonagy, 2016; Lysaker et 
al., 2017; Semerari et al., 2014; Westen & Shedler, 2000). Symptoms, social 
functioning, interpersonal problems and obstacles to treatment differ in line with 
the specific metacognitive dysfunction that causes different problems.  
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In general, patients with severe mental disorder could display difficulties in 
identifying the emotional and ideational components of their mental states, in 
relating ideas to emotions and in connecting ideas or emotions to environmental 
and interpersonal events (Bateman & Fonagy, 2010). Such narratives typically 
involve facts and action with only limited or vague reference to mental states or 
the processes underneath (Carcione et al., 2008; Semerari et al., 2003a). People 
suffering from these deficits could maintain the ability to deduce others’ emotions 
and thoughts (not always), therefore they use expressive signals to understand 
whether the other is, for example, cheerful, sad or worried. It is when trying to 
find the motivation for these emotional states that their interpretations become 
rigid, stereotyped, often unrealistic and at times strongly egocentric.   
Other possible problem is distinguishing between fantasy and reality. In 
these cases, the patients could have trouble to distinguish thoughts and dreams 
from external events. 
The last problem emerging from clinical observations regards building 
integrated and coherent narratives about one’s mental processes, or using such 
knowledge to purposefully regulate mental states. The use of knowledge of mental 
states to master suffering and solve interpersonal problems appears to be 
fundamental for psychological and social functioning. Individuals therefore need a 
wide range of mental problem-solving and coping strategies. The appropriateness 
of these strategies can be evaluated by considering the congruence ratio between 
means-goals and costs-benefits, i.e., the adaptive value of the strategy used 
(Carcione et al., 2008; Semerari et al. 2003a,b; 2007; 2012; 2014).  
Thanks to evidence from neuroscience, the existence of specific aspects of 
metacognition, relatively independent from each other but nonetheless linked, has 
been demonstrated. It has emerged that humans have certain brain areas that are 
more specialized in thinking about one’s own inner states as well as in decoding 
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the minds of others, which are activated selectively in order to help comprehend 
the minds of others considered different from their own (Mitchell, 2006). Thinking 
about personality traits involves different areas compared to thinking about affects 
(Heberlein & Saxe, 2005). Moreover, in selected populations such as schizophrenic 
patients, metacognitive problems are partially unconnected to impaired cognitive 
skills and have a greater impact on patients’ social and professional roles, quality 
of life and symptoms compared to one’s cognitive dysfunctions (Brune, Abdel-
Hamid, Lehmkamper & Sonntag, 2007; Hasson-Ohayon et al, 2015; Lysaker et al., 
2014a).  
To summarize, there are networks of metacognitive functions, so 
consequently there is a need for an assessment tool that: 1) considers 
metacognition to be made up of distinct sub-functions; 2) evaluates each sub-
function separately; 3) evaluates both the abilities possessed by a person in one 
moment of their life, and the evolution over time of these sub-functions. 
 
1.4 Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI): a deep description 
The Third Centre has developed a scale to measure the various elements 
contributing to metacognitive skills which; a) manifest themselves in clinical 
practice; b) are significant in psychopathological terms; c) have an impact on 
treatment, and d) are distinct from each other. The idea is that metacognition is 
composed of a set of linked processes. All processes are connected to the ability to 
identify and ascribe meaning to mental states, at the same time they are semi-
independent of each other, and consequently these processes could be functioning 
or impaired autonomously from each other.  
Therefore, the Metacognition Assessment Scale (MAS; Semerari et al., 2003b) 
aimed to identify metacognitive dysfunctions in patients and to evaluate whether 
they differed from patient to patient and whether success or failure in treatment 
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was linked to these skills. The MAS is a rating scale assessing metacognition 
displayed by patients in their verbalization during psychotherapy, and is divided 
into three scales: understanding of one’s own mind, understanding of others’ mind 
and mastery. Each scale is further composed of different sub-functions. The MAS 
does not stimulate metacognitive functions through specific questions. Therefore, 
when the therapist does not directly investigate one specific sub-function, it is 
impossible to define whether the lack of this sub-function is due to impairment or 
simply to non-use of it in that specific circumstance.  
The Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI; Semerari et al., 2012), an 
adaptation of the MAS, is a semi-structured interview that assesses metacognitive 
functions through	 a sequence of specific pre-established questions. Interviews, 
moreover, have advantages such as avoiding bias in self-ratings, especially as the 
patient is called upon to use skills such as self-reflection, which could be 
compromised. Through the MAI, the interviewer asks the patient to reason about 
mental states in the context of relevant and conflictual personal matters, i.e., when 
it is most important (but also difficult) to be able to fully and swiftly understand 
the mental states of oneself and others. The common theoretical framework of the 
MAS and the MAI is that metacognition is made up of specific and relatively 
independent sub-functions that are likely to be selectively impaired in clinical 
populations.  
The hypotheses were that (a) metacognition could be elicited by such an 
interview and could be reliably scored; (b) metacognition has a two-factor 
structure, corresponding to separate domains, one for understanding mental states 
of one’s self and one for understanding the mental states of others.  
The MAI assesses the description of emotions and cognitions, and the ability 
to identify their own and others’ recurrent patterns of thinking, feeling and 
dealing with social problems. The interview evaluates two main functional skill 
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domains of metacognition, ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, each composed of two dimensions: 
monitoring and integrating for ‘Self’, differentiating and decentering for the 
‘Other’.  
To identify the 16 basic facets of which the dimensions are composed (four 
facets for each dimension), the authors took the clinical literature that describes 
deficit in the ability to know and regulate mental states into account: mentalization 
and attachment theories (Allen, Porter, McFarland, McElhaney & Marsh, 2007; 
Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy and Target, 1997; 2006; Main et al, 1985), theory of mind 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Wellman & Woolley, 
1990), metacognition (Wells, 2000) and more generally, meta- representation (Frith, 
1992).  
The ‘Self’ domain indicates the way in which a person has explicit access to 
his/her own mental state (cognitive and emotional) in relation to behaviour. It 
includes ‘monitoring’ and ‘integrating’ functions, as defined below (Semerari et al., 
2012).  
‘Monitoring’ (MON) refers to the ability of identifying and verbalizing one’s 
own inner states (emotions and cognitions) and subsequent behaviour during a 
described real-life episode. MON consists of four facets: (a) recognizing one’s own 
representations (thoughts and beliefs); (b) recognizing and verbalizing one’s own 
emotions (and bodily sensations); (c) establishing relationships between these 
components of mental states, and (d) establishing relationships between 
components of mental states and behaviour. MON evaluates how a subject 
explains his/her own behaviour in terms of causes and/or motivations.  When 
there is a monitoring deficit, the person is unable to identify and to discern the 
reasons for his/her behaviour, and he/she cannot recognize or verbalize emotions 
or other mental states.  
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‘Integrating’ (INT) is the second dimension of the ‘Self’ domain and it 
involves the ability to produce coherent descriptions of one’s own mental 
processes. INT consists of the capacity to reflect on mental states and contents, to 
put them in a logical order and to rank them by relevance. By using INT abilities, 
the subject is able to understand the link between his/her own mental states and 
different behaviour in different situations, to decode his/her functional and 
dysfunctional habits and to create a consistent narrative of how his/her 
functioning patterns (cognitive, emotional and behavioural) has changed over 
his/her lifespan.  
INT comprises four facets: (a) understanding and telling coherent links 
among thoughts, feelings, events and behaviour; (b) describing transitions among 
different mental states over the course of time and explaining the reasons why; (c) 
creating generalized representations of his/her mental functioning, taking into 
account continuity over time of their own patterns of thinking and feeling; and (d) 
describing one’s own mental functioning to the interviewer, providing enough 
information, without giving irrelevant and out-of- focus details and giving a sense 
of order and coherence to the discourse.  
The ‘Other’ domain refers to skills used to understand thoughts, emotions 
and behaviour of others and to differentiate them from their own. This domain 
comprises ‘differentiating’ and ‘decentering’ functions, as defined below (Semerari 
et al., 2012).  
Differentiating (DIF) concerns the ability to recognize the representational 
nature of one’ s own and other individuals’ thoughts, and to differentiate between 
different types of representations, such as imagination, evaluation, expectation, 
dreams, etc.. This skill allows people to distinguish between representation and 
reality and to consider one’s own point of view as subjective and different of 
other’s points of view. Therefore, good DIF functioning makes people flexible in 
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formulating opinions and points of view and leads to changed mental states on the 
bases of communicative acts and the availability of salient information.  
DIF includes four facets: (a) considering one’s own representation of the 
world as subjective and questionable; (b) giving plausible interpretations of events; 
(c) reflecting on and evaluating events (as opposed to a tendency to act 
impulsively); and (d) distinguishing between different mind representations such 
as dreaming, fantasizing and imagining.  
‘Decentering’ (DEC) indicates the capacity to infer others’ mental states in a 
plausible manner and adopt the perspective of others, recognizing that it is distinct 
from their own. DEC leads to the comprehension that people’s behaviour is based 
on the understanding of others’ aims, beliefs and values, which could be different 
from their own and independent of the relationship that the person has with the 
subject. 
 DEC involves the ability to describe others’ psychology in a plausible and 
clear way, without using stereotypes or cliché.  Furthermore, it also includes the 
skill to realize that they are generally not the center of others’ intentions and goals. 
DEC comprises four facets: (a) recognizing, defining and verbalizing other 
people’s emotional inner state; (b) recognizing, defining and verbalizing other 
people’s cognitive inner state; (c) establishing links among the separate 
components of others’ mental states; and (d) establishing links between the 
components of others’ mental states and their behaviour.   
The MAI consists of four modules, corresponding to the four metacognitive 
functions described above. For each function, the interviewer has to ask a 
structured list of questions. For more details, the Appendix 1 reports the entire 
interview. 
To evaluate whether patients are really trying to use their metacognition, the 
interviewer needs to a) gather background information about where and when the 
	
	
30	
formers’ narrative took place, who was present, what the topic of the story is and 
what the problem described is, and b) assess the emotional states (if possible, with 
somatic correlations) and thoughts that patients experienced at that moment, and 
c) patients have to provide sufficient details regarding what led them to ascribe a 
given mental state.  
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CHAPTER 2 
METACOGNITION IN PATIENTS WITH SEVERE MENTAL DISORDERS 
 
2.1 Metacognition and Schizophrenia   
Many studies have demonstrated metacognitive impairment among people 
with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Arnon-Ribenfeld, Hasson-Ohayon, 
Lavidor, Atzil-Slonim & Lysaker, 2017; Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015; Lysaker & 
Hasson-Ohayon, 2014; Vohs et al. 2014).  The role of metacognition has been 
evaluated in various studies including both clinical and non-clinical populations 
(Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015; Ladegaard, Lysaker, Larsen & Videbech, 2014; 
Lysaker et al., 2014b). These studies reveal that individuals with various 
psychiatric diagnoses experience varying levels of metacognitive deficits: a  
variance has also been found in a non-clinical population (Rabin et al., 2014). In 
particular, Hasson-Ohayon et al. (2015) found that among people with 
schizophrenia, metacognitive capacity was significantly lower than in non-clinical 
populations. Given the important effect of these deficits on both an individual’s 
experience and on the maintenance of interpersonal relationships (Harrington, 
Siegert & McClure, 2005; Langdon Coltheart, Ward & Catts. 2002; Lysaker, 
Campbell & Johannesen 2005a), there is a need to pay particular attention to 
metacognitive functions among people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. In 
the original findings of Lysaker et al. (2005b; 2007), individuals with schizophrenia 
displayed impaired metacognition, which in turn diminished their capacity in 
relation to symptoms, neurocognition, as well as social and vocational functioning.  
Several studies have explored the links between metacognition and 
symptoms, both positive and negative, emotional discomfort (including anxiety, 
depression, active social avoidance and guilt), cognitive symptoms and 
disorganized symptoms. It is evident that metacognition deficits are associated 
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with negative symptoms (Lysaker et al., 2012, 2015a; Mitchell, 2012; Nicolò et al., 
2012), disorganization symptoms (Lysaker, Dimaggio, Buck, Carcione, & Nicolo, 
2007), depressed mood and delusions (D'Antonio & Serper, 2012), poor social 
support, relationship quality (Kimhy et al., 2012) as well as reduced independent 
living (Tabak et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, the role of metacognition in young individuals, developing 
their first psychotic episode, has also been investigated. This is an important issue, 
since detecting metacognition deficits at this stage could help to identify treatment 
goals when the illness is more malleable and psychological interventions could 
positively affect the course of the disorder (Alvarez-Jiménez et al., 2011). Some 
authors demonstrated that dysfunctions in metacognition are present in both early 
and later phases of schizophrenia (Brune et al., 2011; Lysaker et al., 2015b; Macbeth 
et al., 2014; Vohs et al., 2014). Mcleod et al. (2014) found that metacognitive 
dysfunction is a characteristic of the early phases of the illness, which predict 
positive and negative symptoms that appear 12 months later. This would suggest 
that this is a significant contributor to suffering and social dysfunction as early as 
the very initial stages of the disease. Furthermore, in Langdon et al.’s study (2014), 
patients with early psychosis showed difficulties in understanding others’ mental 
states. This was evident in tasks that involved sequencing humorous pictures 
requiring inference about the characters in the stories shown.   
Metacognitive dysfunction might also impair help-seeking before initial 
contact with the mental health services, and this has an impact on the duration of 
untreated psychosis (DUP) phase (Macbeth et al., 2016). Although there is a well-
known association between prolonged DUP and poorer outcomes (Penttilä, 
Jääskeläinen, Hirvonen, Isohanni, & Miettunen, 2014), evidence is still limited 
regarding associations between DUP and metacognition. Additionally, some 
authors showed that poor metacognition has been consistently associated with 
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poor insight into illness (Bedford & David, 2014; Lysaker et al. 2013a; Lysaker, 
Pattison, Leonhardt, Phelps & Vohs, 2018; Nicolò et al., 2012; Popolo et al., 2016) 
and that the reduced self-reflection is related to poorer therapeutic outcomes 
(Lysaker et al., 2010). Moreover, the incapability to integrate various aspects of 
themselves and others in a coherent psychological representation may obstruct 
remembering positive aspects of relationships during moments of distress and this 
could lead to disengagement from therapeutic pathways (MacBeth, Gumley, 
Schwannauer & Fisher et al., 2015). All these findings confirm the need to take 
action as soon as possible when considering metacognitive deficits.  
Another important issue is the relationship between metacognition and 
psychosocial functioning. Several studies have demonstrated that metacognitive 
dysfunctions affect patients’ quality of life and social functioning (James et al. 2016; 
Lysaker et al. 2015b; Penn et al. 1997; Roberts & Bailey, 2013), vocational 
functioning (Lysaker et al., 2011b; Luedtke et al., 2012), self-care (Brune et al., 2011) 
and social quality of life (Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015; Rabin et al., 2014). In this 
latter research, metacognitive abilities among individuals with schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders were negatively associated with symptoms severity and 
positively associated with psychosocial functioning measures.  
Consequently, metacognitive deficits, are linked to impaired social and 
vocational functions and to social alienation, as such deficits seem to make it 
difficult for the individual to form social bonds or seek support from others 
(Lysaker et al., 2010; Roe, 2005). For these reasons, recent conceptualizations of 
schizophrenia propose that one of the greatest barriers to psychosocial functioning 
is deficits in metacognition, which limit a person's ability to make sense of their 
social, psychological and biological challenges (Lysaker & Hasson-Ohayon, 2014; 
Semerari et al., 2003a). Indeed, metacognition allows individuals to conjecture 
what others think and feel, permitting them to decide how to effectively respond 
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to social and psychological difficulties (Lysaker et al., 2013c; Lysaker & Dimaggio, 
2014; Lysaker & Hasson-Ohayon, 2014; Semerari et al., 2003a,b). 
Some authors suggested that schizophrenia symptoms mediate the 
association between metacognitive abilities and social quality of life (Frith, 2004). 
Rabin et al. (2014) demonstrated that negative symptoms in people with 
schizophrenia mediated the association between understanding others’ minds and 
social quality of life. This approach contrasts intuitive interpretations that propose 
rather that schizophrenia symptoms influence metacognitive deficits and that 
these deficits in turn, compromise social quality of life.  
An important recent meta-analysis (Arnon-Ribenfeld et al., 2017) indicates 
other possible explanations for the relationship between symptoms, metacognition 
and psychosocial functioning. The authors showed that deficits in metacognitive 
abilities affect psychosocial functioning. Consequently, this association impacts the 
symptomatology of schizophrenia and so metacognitive abilities help individuals 
regulate their social behaviour. Therefore, deficits in metacognitive functions may 
negatively influence interpersonal relationships, resulting in increased 
symptomatology that may be expressed by a trend towards withdraw (Brune & 
Brune-Cohrs, 2006; Lysaker et al., 2015b; Salvatore et al., 2008). 
In relation to the positive association between metacognition and 
psychosocial functioning, James and colleagues (2016) showed that this association 
was independent of symptoms, i.e., metacognitive abilities moderate the 
association between dysfunctional self-appraisal and social functioning and this 
relationship persists after controlling for severity of psychopathology. This result 
agrees with the above meta-analysis (Arnon-Ribenfeld et al., 2017) that states the 
need to differentiate between symptoms and psychosocial functioning, which 
correlate with metacognition. 
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Finally, several authors propose that insight into severe mental disorders, as 
a form of reflective self-knowledge, is associated with negative implications such 
as self-stigma, shame, lower sense of meaning, hope and quality of life (Hasson-
Ohayon, Kravetz, Roe, David & Weiser, 2006; Hasson-Ohayon, Kravetz, Meir & 
Rozencwaig, 2009; Hasson-Ohayon, et al., 2012). However, a recent study indicates 
that metacognition might be a protective factor from the negative implications of 
insight (Lysaker et al., 2013a). Therefore, it seems important to distinguish 
between the different protective or side effects each metacognitive ability may 
have as individuals acquire insight. 
 
2.2 Metacognition and Personality Disorders  
The skills to reflect on one's own mental states and on those of others are 
strongly involved in Personality Disorders (PDs) (Moroni et al., 2016). Semerari et 
al. (2014) demonstrated that patients with PDs had lower metacognitive abilities 
than patients without PDs.  These deficits were present in each sub-function and 
persisted even when symptoms were considered as covariates (except for 
‘monitoring’, which was the only function significantly affected by symptoms). 
Therefore, impairment of metacognitive functions seems to be independent 
of/from the severity of symptoms. On the other hand, lower metacognitive 
performance was associated with more personality disorder severity. Indeed, their 
results showed a strong negative correlation between metacognitive functioning 
and severity of PD diagnosis. The greater difficulties of PD patients in managing 
and coping with the demands of everyday life were attributable, at least to some 
extent, to poorer metacognitive abilities (Semerari et al., 2014). 
The authors concluded that metacognitive impairment might be a general 
dimension of personality disorders, which should be taken into account in the 
current nosography of diagnostic criteria. The relationship between specific 
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personality profiles and metacognitive functioning indicates that individual 
metacognitive deficits could selectively affect the symptomatic expression of 
personality. Indeed, even with patients with PDs, there may be different 
metacognitive profiles dependant on different disorders. For example, Moroni et 
al. (2016) showed that patients with avoidant personality disorder had more 
difficulties in monitoring and decentering metacognitive functions compared to 
other PDs. On the other hand, Semerari et al. (2015) demonstrated that Borderline 
PD patients had more difficulties than patients with other PDs in differentiation 
and integrating metacognitive functions, even when the severity of 
psychopathology was controlled. Consistent with previous arguments, other 
studies on patients with PDs revealed that different profiles of metacognitive 
impairment corresponded to patients with different personality disorders 
(Carcione et al., 2011; Dimaggio et al., 2009a; Semerari et al., 2003a, b; 2005; 2007; 
2014).  
Moreover, a recent study (Lysaker et al., 2017) suggests that metacognitive 
functioning is affected differentially in different mental disorders. The Borderline 
PD group showed significantly greater levels of metacognitive capacity than the 
schizophrenia group and lower levels than the substance use group. Furthermore, 
Borderline PD group revealed significantly higher levels of self-reflectivity and 
awareness of others’ minds than the schizophrenia group but less mastery and 
decentering abilities than the substance use group. Finally, the Borderline PD 
group had significantly higher levels of alexithymia than the substance use group 
and did not differ from schizophrenia group. 
  The various domains of metacognition were more closely related in the 
Schizophrenia group relative to the Borderline PD group. Moreover, this research 
suggests that metacognitive problems in schizophrenia are of a global nature, 
while in Borderline PD certain aspects of metacognition are more intact than 
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others. In fact, the MAS mean scores of Borderline PD patients indicated that this 
group were able to describe their own and others’ cognitive and affective states 
and to reflect upon these, but were not able to appreciate others’ perspectives 
(Semerari et al., 2005; 2014; 2015), nor use psychological knowledge to solve 
interpersonal matters. 
Another important issue regarding PDs is that the personality profile seems 
to play an important role in identifying the risk of violence,  both personality 
features and PDs (Coid, 2002; Fountoulakis, Leucht & Kaprinis, 2008; Reid & 
Thorne, 2007). The personality disorders most commonly associated with this 
aspect are anti-social and borderline ones (Howard, Huband, Duggan & Mannion, 
2008), also in comorbidity with substance abuse (Fountoulakis et al., 2008). 
Bateman & Fonagy (2010) found that patients with BPD had reduced 
capacity to mentalize, leading to problems with emotional regulation and 
difficulties in managing impulsivity, especially in the context of interpersonal 
interactions. This condition is even more evident in conflicting relationships. 
Another PD strongly associated with mentalization deficit, which leads to 
difficulties in managing of social interaction is Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(APD), which shares certain psychopathological dimensions with BPD (Bateman et 
al., 2016). In particular, overlap involves strong impulsivity and unpredictability, 
problems with emotional regulation and controlling anger and behaviour that may 
be considered manipulative by others (Bateman et al., 2016). The literature clearly 
shows that patients with APD have a general and deep impairment in 
metacognitive skills, including deficits in recognising basic emotions (Marsh & 
Blair, 2008), in social cognition and in the capacity to link mental states to 
behaviour (Mize & Pettit, 2008; Tolan, Dodge & Rutter, 2013). Furthermore, certain 
patients with APD show a blend of perspective-taking problems and difficulty in 
reading others’ mental states (Fonagy, 2004; McGauley, Ferris, Marin-Avellan & 
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Fonagy, 2013; Taubner, White, Zimmermann, Fonagy & Nolte, 2013). This is 
consistent with the literature’s mentalization deficit theory as well as other 
theories of anti-social behaviour (Blair, 2001; Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-
Peretz & Levkovitz, 2010). Some studies demonstrated that one pathway to adult 
anti-social personality develops from early child conduct disorder via alcohol 
abuse in early adolescence to compromised function of the cognitive control 
system, of which mentalization is a part (Howard et al., 2008; Howard, 2006). This 
in turn matures throughout adolescence and into early adulthood.  
Many studies have demonstrated the relationship between anger, hostility, 
impulsivity, and violent behaviour (Birkley & Eckhardt, 2015; Norlander and 
Eckhardt, 2005; Ramírez & Andreu, 2006; Rubio-Garay, Carrasco, & Amor, 2016). 
In particular, in Garofalo et al’s (2016) study, the group of incarcerated violent 
offenders reported higher levels of hostility than the community sample. The 
authors suggest that the tendency to perceive the world as hostile is a feature of a 
patients’ psychological functioning and therefore, may be a strong predictor of 
violent behaviour. 
In general, other research shows that the most frequently involved 
personality disorders within the context of violence were those belonging to 
cluster B (Bo et al., 2013; Moran & Hodgins, 2004; Mueser et al., 1997). Data 
revealed that subjects from forensic and non-forensic settings with a schizophrenia 
diagnosis in comorbidity had the following PDs: 46.3% antisocial personality 
disorder, 21.3% narcissistic personality disorder, 17.6% borderline personality 
disorder, 19.4% paranoid personality disorder, 17.6% avoidant personality 
disorder. However, only anti-social and borderline personality disorders were 
positively associated with aggression (Bo et al., 2013).  
Although most evidence demonstrates specific associations between Cluster 
B disorders and violence, some research has reported that a general increase in 
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personality pathology per se, unrelatedly with the particular pathological traits, 
also increases the risk of both impulsive and premeditated aggression (Nouvion, 
Cherek, Lane, Tcheremissine & Lieving, 2007; Stanford et al., 2003). Consequently, 
clearly, personality traits and personality disorders are very important aspects 
involved with both metacognitive dysfunction and aggressive behaviour. For this 
reason, the relationship between metacognitive functions, personality profiles and 
violence will have to be investigated in further studies. 
  
2.3  Metacognition in patients with a history of violence 
In patients with schizophrenia and history of violent behaviour, a poor 
metacognition resulted associated with aggressions (Abu-Akel & Abushua’leh, 
2004; Bo, Kongerslev, Dimaggio, Lysaker, & Abu-Akel, 2015; Fonagy & Levinson, 
2004). It is very important to consider that premeditated aggression is associated 
with relatively intact ‘cognitive’ but severely impaired ‘affective’ metacognitive 
functions; in contrast, impulsive aggression was linked to difficulties in both 
cognitive and affective processing of mental states (Bo et al., 2013; Bo, Abu-Akel, 
Kongerslev, Haahr & Bateman 2014). Indeed, the relationship between 
metacognition and violence does not always go in the same direction but may 
depend on the type of aggressive behaviour (premeditated or impulsive). 
Abu-Akel and colleagues (2015) demonstrated that patients with 
schizophrenia characterised by extreme levels of psychopathy (scoring above 24 on 
the Psychopathy Checklist—Revised) showed better overall metacognitive abilities 
compared to patients with schizophrenia without psychopathy; this research 
indicates that the former represent a specific group in which schizophrenia has a 
reduced damaging effect on metacognition. Nevertheless, the ‘mastery’ function 
(subscale of the Metacognition Assessment Scale) in psychopathic patients was 
found compromised; this function refers to the skill of using one's own mental 
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state to solve social and psychological problems. These findings may suggest that 
the relative conservation of metacognitive functions in patients with schizophrenia 
characterised by extreme levels of psychopathy could contribute to their violent 
behaviour as it could allow them to understand how to manipulate their victims 
(understanding what the victim feels, desires, fears, etc.). In addition, this 
condition is worsened by the impairment of mastery skills that damage their 
ability to solve interpersonal matters. 
Consequently, the psychological interventions that are specifically targeted 
at enhancing the capacity of the ‘mastery’ function in patients with high levels of 
psychopathy may be effective in dealing with psychological and social problems 
that lead to frustration and violent behaviour (Abu-Akel et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, there is also evidence showing that psychosocial skills 
such as empathising and understanding the perspective of others are correlated to 
reduced aggressive behaviour (Abu-Akel & Abushual’eh, 2004; Flight & Forth, 
2007; Woodworth & Porter, 2002). 
Coherent with the abovementioned study (Abu-Akel et al., 2015), Mitchell 
and colleagues’ research (2012) reported lower mastery scores in forensic patients 
with schizophrenia compared to patients without history of violence. Data 
revealed that both groups performed significantly better on ‘understanding their 
own mind’ compared to ‘understanding others’ minds’ and ‘mastery’: even if a 
small effect size emerged, data indicated higher scores for ‘understanding others’ 
minds’ compared to ‘mastery’. This ‘hierarchical’ pattern of metacognitive 
functions is consistent with previous results whereby it is proposed that being able 
to first recognise one’s own mental state will have a strong influence on being able 
to understand the mental state of others. A hierarchical concept of metacognitive 
functioning is central in terms of (a) differentiating skills of metacognitive 
functioning and (b) levels of metacognitive functioning overall in order to offer 
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appropriate psychological therapies based on individuals’ levels of competence 
(Lysaker, Gumley, & Dimaggio, 2011). 
In general, some research has found a poor reflective and metacognitive 
functioning in violent patients (Abu-Akel & Abushualeh, 2004; Fonagy & 
Levinson, 2004; Bo et al., 2015). 
Another key aspect of metacognitive functioning and the risk of violence 
concerns child maltreatment. The World Health Organization’s definition of child 
maltreatment (2006) encompasses neglect and negligent treatment, physical and 
emotional mistreatment, or sexual abuse. Child maltreatment is correlated with the 
development of conduct disorder (Afifi, McMillan, Asmundson, Pietrzak & Sareen 
2011; Jaffee, Harrington, Cohen & Moffitt, 2005) and a heightened potential for 
violent behaviour (Anda et al., 2006; Caspi et al., 2002; Keenan, Wroblewski, 
Hipwell, Loeber, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 2010). In particular, many studies have 
shown that experiences of child maltreatment are connected with an increased 
level of aggressive behaviour in the maltreated child or adolescent (Chen, Coccaro, 
Lee & Jacobson, 2012; Taubner, Zimmermann, Ramberg & Schroder, 2016; Weder 
et al., 2009).  
Attachment representations play an important role with regard to 
aggressiveness: inhibiting aggressive behaviour in the case of secure attachment 
(Allen et al., 2007) or, in the case of insecure attachment, leading to a vulnerability 
(van Ijzendoorn, Schuengel & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1999). In contrast, Taubner 
and colleagues (2016) found that the effect of child maltreatment on the risk of 
violence was not mediated by attachment representations. However, a secure 
attachment relationship promotes the development of good mentalisation abilities 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004): a secure early attachment relationship allows an infant 
to develop an awareness of their own internal state, from which more complex 
representations (also concerning others’ minds) can then be developed (Choi-Kain 
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& Gunderson, 2008). It is clear that in a maltreating relationship, the attachment 
can be damaged and the development of such skills might be highly compromised.  
For these reasons, maltreatment appears to be a greater risk for violence both 
per se and because it compromises the development of metacognitive skills, which 
in turn are protective factors of/for aggressive behaviour. In fact, consistently with 
the previous studies, mentalisation abilities could prevent violent and aggressive 
behaviour (Blair, 1995) and, at the same time, poor or absent mentalisation has 
been documented to lead to vulnerability and aggressive behaviour (Ha, Sharp & 
Goodyer, 2011; Taubner et al., 2013). 
Emotion recognition is another relevant dimension implicated in aggressive 
behaviour and metacognitive functions. Indeed, the face’s emotional expression 
and its recognition are very significant cues in social interaction, overall in the 
conflictual ones. Currently, many studies have demonstrated the association 
between aggressive behaviour and patients with deficits in emotion recognition. In 
their meta-analysis, Marsh and Blair (2008) found that individuals who exhibit 
inappropriate interpersonal and antisocial behaviour have problems in facial 
emotion recognition, particularly fear and sadness. If a person cannot correctly 
identify the distress they are causing to another person, they are more likely to 
continue with the behaviour that is causing the harm. Other studies have come to 
the same conclusions about specific fear and sadness recognition impairments 
among antisocial individuals, including adults with psychopathy (Blair, 2004; 
Glass & Newman, 2006), adolescents with conduct disorder (Fairchild, Van 
Goozen, Stollery & Goodyer, 2008) and people with mental health problems and 
history of maltreatment (Leist & Dadds, 2009). Another meta-analysis indicates 
that a more general facial emotion recognition impairment is evident in 
psychopathy (Dawel, O'Kearney, McKone & Palermo, 2012). Wegrzyn, Westphal 
and Kissler (2017) found that violent offenders present with a reliable hostile 
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attribution bias, in that they rate ambiguous fear-anger expressions as more angry; 
indeed, there was a lowered threshold to detect anger in violent offenders 
compared to the general population. Therefore, the hostile attribution bias leads to 
a characteristic misperception of facial expressions and this mechanism might 
mediate physical violence. Moreover, emotional recognition could be connected to 
metacognitive functions, particularly in patients with severe mental disorders 
(Lysaker et al., 2014c).  
To conclude, the evidence in this field is still limited and sometimes 
contradictory, therefore, future investigations will be necessary to better 
understand the role of metacognitive functions in the risk of acting violent 
behaviour by people with severe mental disorders. The present research aims to 
make a contribution in this direction. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE METACOGNITION IN THE VIORMED STUDY: A LONGITUDINAL 
STUDY ON PATIENTS WITH A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE 
 
3.1 Aims and hypotheses 
The present study is a sub-project of the ‘Violence Risk and Mental 
Disorders’ (VIORMED) project (for further details, see de Girolamo et al., 2016; 
Barlati et al., submitted). This is a prospective cohort study involving inpatients 
living in Residential Facilities (RFs) and outpatients of Departments of Mental 
Health (DMH) in Northern Italy.  
The present study aims to investigate metacognitive functions as potential 
discriminating factors, underneath other clinical characteristics, between people 
with severe mental disorders who have behaved aggressively and people with the 
same disorders who have never behaved aggressively.  
In particular, the aims of the study are the following. 
1. To investigate the differences between patients with a poor metacognitive 
functioning and patients with a good metacognitive functioning in relation to 
history of violence (retrospective phase). 
2. To explore the differences between patients with a poor metacognitive 
functioning and patients with a good metacognitive functioning in relation to 
other important aspects potentially involved in aggressive behaviour such as 
personality traits, anger, impulsiveness, hostility and emotion recognition. 
3. To investigate the differences between patients with a poor metacognitive 
functioning and patients with a good metacognitive functioning in relation to 
aggressive behaviour (verbal, physical against object, self-harm, physical against 
people) displayed by patients during the one year follow-up (prospective phase). 
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4. To analyse the predictors of aggressive behaviour and evaluate if the 
metacognitive functions associated with other investigated aspects (personality 
traits, anger, impulsiveness, hostility, emotion recognition) are related to 
aggressive behaviour during the one-year follow-up.  
The hypothesis of the study is that impaired metacognitive functions lead to 
an increased risk of violence in patients with severe mental disorders. In fact, as 
shown in previous chapters, the ability to understand their own internal states and 
those of others is crucial to the effective management of relational problems and 
this can be decisive in avoiding aggressive behaviour against other people: 
patients with this ability may find a different way to communicate their state of 
discomfort, and start a dialogue that can also take into account the other’s point of 
view. This adaptive strategy can make possible a peaceful and effective solution. 
For these considerations, the hypotheses are: 
(a) Patients with a poor metacognitive functioning will report more frequent 
interpersonal violence in the past compared to patients with a good metacognitive 
functioning; 
(b) Patients with a poor metacognitive functioning will show more aggressive 
behaviour during the one-year follow-up compared to patients with a good 
metacognitive functioning; 
(c) Patients with a poor metacognitive functioning will show: 1) more clinically 
significant personality traits, 2) more difficulty in emotion recognition, and 3) 
more levels of hostility, impulsivity and anger compared to patients with a good 
metacognitive functioning; 
(d) A poor metacognitive functioning added to other important variables such 
as personality traits, anger, impulsiveness, hostility and emotion recognition will 
increase the risk of aggressive behaviour during the one-year follow-up. 
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3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
In the original VIORMED study, 386 patients were recruited and half of 
them had a history of violence. However, one recruiting centre did not participate 
in this sub-project on metacognitive functions, therefore 96 patients were not 
involved. Of the 290 patients included in this study, 98 chose not to participate: 
indeed, the interview for assessment of metacognition was audio-recorded and 
this procedure caused them discomfort. The main clinical and sociodemographic 
features were compared between refusers and compliers: the only differences 
found regarded the diagnosis and the patients’ collaboration. In particular, 
patients who refused suffered more frequently from schizophrenia compared to 
patients who accepted (70% vs 47%, p=.002), and were less collaborative in their 
treatment (84% vs 93%, p=.013). The patients who consented to participate were 
192, but 12 were excluded because the interviews were considered invalid, as the 
interviews contents were not suitable and sufficient for scoring. Therefore, the total 
sample of this study included 180 patients: 56% outpatients and 44% inpatients. 
The majority of the sample are male (75%), married (62%), with a medium-low 
education level (69%), unemployment (71%) and with a mean age of 44 years. 
In order to examine the metacognitive functions in relation to the various 
aspects investigated, including the primary outcome (aggressive behaviour), the 
patients were split into two groups: patients with poor metacognitive functions 
(Poor Metacognition group=PM) and patients with good metacognitive functions 
(Good Metacognition group=GM). The division was based on the Likert scale 
scores (1=absent; 2=poor; 3=good with help; 4=very good; 5=very good and 
spontaneous) of the Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI) and on scores 
reported by our sample (average range 1.2-3.6). As a result, patients with an 
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average total score less than 2.5 were classified as PM, while those with an average 
score equal to or greater than 2.5 were classified as GM.  
In the final sample made up of 180 patients, 87 patients belong to the Poor 
Metacognition group (PM) and 93 to the Good Metacognition group (GM).  
Comparing the two groups with regard to social and demographic 
characteristics, they did not differ in the following aspects: treatment settings 
(outpatients and inpatients), gender, employment, social contacts, daily activities, 
family support and patient collaboration on their treatment. On the other hand, 
patients in the PM group were older and were in education for fewer years 
compared to those in the GM group (Table 1). Observing the clinical facets, there 
are no significant differences between the two groups in relation to the diagnosis, 
the number of compulsory admissions and substance or alcohol use. On the 
contrary, PM patients showed a longer duration of the disorder and a later contact 
with the services compared to GM patients. In the symptoms level and in the 
psychosocial functioning assessments (respectively BPRS and FPS scores), no 
significant differences emerged between the two groups (Table 2).  
 
Patients with a History of Violence 
Ninety-six patients (53%) of the sample have a lifetime history of violence 
represented by a documented event of physical aggression against other people. 
The violent event in 70% of cases is physical assault, 7% stalking, 4% attempted 
murder, and 4% murder. Other cases involve other types of violent acts against 
people. In addition, 35% of patients had assaulted other people in the 6 months 
before the violent event. Sixty-five percent of the patients, at the time of the violent 
act, were already diagnosed with mental disorder and charged of MHSs. In 30% of 
the cases, despite the violent act, there was no physical damage to the victim; in 
50% the wounds were moderate, in 20% there were very severe injuries (also 
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leading to death). In 45% of the cases the victims were family members, in the 
other 20% the victims were still close and well-known, of which 7% were 
healthcare staff. The patients, at the time of the violent act, were under the 
influence of alcohol in 28% of cases and substances in 13%, while there were 
psychosis symptoms in 40%. Only 37% of the cases received a definitive sentence 
(average duration 3 years), which in most cases were spent at Forensic Mental 
Hospitals. Almost half of the patients (40%) with a history of violence also showed 
self-harm and/or suicidal behaviour. 
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Table 1. Differences in sociodemographic characteristics between PM and GM 
patients 
 PM 
(N=87) 
GM 
(N=93) 
Test* p-value 
Age     
Mean (SD) 46.67 (10.2) 41.01 (9.36) F=15.34 <.001 
Gender     
Male (%) 69 (79.3) 66 (71.0) Χ2= 1.67 .196 
Female( %) 18 (20.7) 27 (29.0) 
Setting     
Outpatients (%) 47 (54.0) 54 (58.1) Χ2= .3 .585 
Inpatients (%) 40 (46.0) 39 (41.9)   
Marital status     
Single (%) 33 (37.9) 36 (38.7) Χ2= .012 .914 
Married or cohabitating (%) 54 (62.1) 57 (61.3) 
Education     
Low (%) 67 (77.0) 57 (61.3) Χ2= 5.18 .023 
Medium-high (%) 20 (23.0) 36 (38.7) 
Employment     
Employed (%) 24 (27.6) 27 (29.7) Χ2= .10 .759 
Unemployed (%) 63 (72.4) 64 (70.3) 
Cohabiting     
Alone (%) 26 (33.8) 19 (23.8) Χ2= 5.53 .063 
Family (%) 43 (55.8) 58 (72.5) 
Others (%) 8 (10.4) 3 (3.8) 
Frequent social contacts      
Yes (%) 77 (80.2) 65 (78.3) Χ2= .097 .755 
No (%) 19 (19.8) 18 (21.7) 
Time spent doing nothing     
Up to 3 hours a day (%) 32 (36.8) 43 (47.3) Χ2= 2 .157 
More than 3 hours a day (%) 55 (63.2) 48 (52.7) 
Family support     
Present (%) 58 (69.9) 68 (78.2) Χ2= 1.52 .218 
Absent (%) 25 (30.1) 19 (21.8) 
Treatment collaboration     
Collaborative (%) 78 (90.7) 88 (96.7) Χ2= 2.74 .098 
Not collaborative (%) 8 (9.3) 3 (3.3) 
*Chi-square test for the categorical variables and ANOVA for quantitative variables  
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Table 2. Differences in clinical characteristics between PM patients and GM 
patients 
 PM 
(N=87) 
GM 
(N=93) 
Test p-value* 
Disorder duration in years (M,SD) 20.9 (10.09) 16.58 (9.22) F=5.88 .016 
Age of the first contact with 
services (M,SD) 
30.17 (11.9) 26.78 (8.44) F=5.18 .024 
Lifetime compulsory admissions     
None (%) 41 (54.7) 46 (56.1) F= 3.44 .173 
1 – 3 (%) 27 (36.0) 34 (41.5) 
>= 4 (%) 7 (9.3) 2 (2.4) 
Primary psychiatric diagnosis 
defined by the clinician 
    
Schizophrenia (%) 38 (43.7) 41 (44.1) Χ2= 1.58 .664 
Personality disorders (%) 29 (33.3) 26 (28.0) 
Bipolar disordes (%) 9 (10.3) 15 (16.1) 
Anxiety and mood disorders (%) 11 (12.6) 11 (11.8) 
Personality disorders defined by 
SCID II 
    
Cluster A (%) 15 (20.3) 13 (16.5) F=4.37 .386 
Cluster B (%) 32 (43.2) 29 (36.7) 
Cluster C (%) 2 (2.7) 5 (6.3) 
Other (%) 10 (13.5) 7 (8.9) 
None (%) 15 (20.3) 25 (31.06) 
Lifetime substance abuse     
No (%) 55 (65.5) 46 (53.5) Χ2= 2.53 .112 
Yes (%) 29 (34.5) 40 (46.5) 
Lifetime alcohol abuse     
No (%) 50 (58.1) 56 (62.2) Χ2= 0.31 .580 
Yes (%) 36 (41.9) 34 (37.8) 
BPRS     
BPRS_Tot 41.9(16.4) 38.1 (11.8) U=-1.18 .237 
BPRS_Anxiety- Depression 8.0 (3.6) 7.9 (3.5) U=-.30 .763 
BPRS_Hostility- Suspicion 6.1 (3.2) 5.2 (2.4) U=-1.59 .111 
BPRS_ Thinking disorders 7.4 (4.7) 6.6 (3.1) U=-.53 .596 
BPRS_ Withdrawal 6.4 (3.5) 5.8 (2.4) U=-.91 .365 
BPRS_ Activation 4.3(2.1) 4.0 (1.6) U=-.71 .480 
FPS 54.9 (16.6) 57.1 (17.6) F=.75 .387 
*Chi-square test or Fisher’ Exact test for the categorical variables and ANOVA for quantitative 
variables or Mann Whitney-test for continuous non-normal variables. 
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3.2.2 Measures 
Clinical assessment 
A Patient Schedule was used to collect information about sociodemographic 
characteristics, social relationships, leisure activities, socioeconomic status, clinical 
and treatment-related features. A specific section (only for violent patients) 
concerning their history of violence was filled out for each patient.  
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV for Axis I (SCID-I) and Axis II 
(SCID-II) are semi-structured interviews based on the DSM-IV criteria and were 
used to confirm standardised clinical diagnoses (First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, 
Benjamin, 1997; First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 2002). These instruments are 
two very complex interviews that investigate every criterion of every disorder 
included in the DSM-IV and last approximately 2 hours each. Cohen’s Kappa 
indices vary from .61 to .83 for SCID-I and .77 to .94 for SCID-II, therefore they 
display good concordance (Lobbestael, Leurgans & Arntz, 2011). 
Psychopathology was assessed by the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) 
(Ventura, Green, Shaner & Liberman, 1993), which is a rating scale to measure 
psychiatric symptoms: each symptom is rated 1-7 (the highest scores correspond to 
very severe symptoms) and a total of 24 symptoms are scored. Cronbach’s α for the 
five scales utilised in the current study were as follows: Thinking Disorder .65, 
Withdrawal .61, Anxiety-Depression .68, Hostility-Suspicion .47, and Activation 
.64 (Burger, Calsyn, Morse, Klinkenberg & Trusty 1997). 
Psychosocial functioning was evaluated by the Personal and Social 
Performance (PSP) scale, a modified version of the DSM-IV Social and 
Occupational Functioning Assessment Scale (SOFAS) (Morosini, Magliano, 
Brambilla, Ugolini & Pioli 2000). The scale consists of a single score that ranges 
from 0 to 100 and the highest number indicates the best functioning. The 
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psychometric indices are very good: the Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) is 
.94, and Cohen’s Kappa is .98 (Nasrallah, Morosini & Gagnon, 2008). 
 
Metacognition assessment 
The Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI) is a semi-structured 
interview aimed at investigating metacognitive functions according to the 
theoretical construct described in the first chapter. The ICC for Monitoring facets 
ranges from .54 to .69; for Differentiating facets from .44 to .76; for Integrating 
facets from .59 to .64; and for Decetring facets from .41 to .57. Cronbach’s α for the 
global scale is .91 (Semerari et al., 2012).  
The interview begins with an open question asking the patient to describe a 
relational negative autobiographical episode (conflicting and/or source of 
discomfort) which had occurred in the last 6 months. In order to evaluate the 
patient’s comprehension in relation to the others’ mental state, the episode has to 
include an interaction with another person. The worst episode of the last six 
months was investigated to be able to evaluate metacognitive functions in critical 
circumstances. After the patient reports the episode, the interviewer sets out 
predefined questions that sequentially investigate 4 metacognitive (sub)functions: 
monitoring, differentiating, integrating and decentring. 
Each of these functions is evaluated by four specifiers (related to the 
questions), to which a score from 1 to 5 is assigned (the higher score indicates more 
functionality), therefore each function will have a score between 4 and 20, and the 
total score of the 4 (sub)functions indicates the general metacognitive functioning 
and ranges from 16 to 80.  
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Aggressiveness, impulsivity and hostility assessment 
Aggression and impulsivity were evaluated using the following self-report 
instruments.  
The Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (BDHI) is a 75-item true/false 
questionnaire developed to assess 8 subscales related to hostility, resentment and 
negative affect: Cronbach α was .822 (p=.001), (Buss & Durkee, 1957).  The 8 
subscales are: Assault, Indirect aggression, Irritability, Negativism, Resentment, 
Suspicion, Verbal aggression and Guilt. 
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) is a 30-item, 4-point Likert scale 
questionnaire on personality and behavioural impulsiveness, with scores ranging 
from 30 to 120 (Barratt, 1965; Patton, Stanford & Barratt 1995): in the Italian 
validation Cronbach’s α for internal consistency is .79 (Fossati, Di Ceglie, 
Acquarini & Barratt, 2001). This includes 3 subscales: Cognitive impulsiveness, 
Motor impulsiveness and Non-planning impulsiveness. 
The State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory 2 (STAXI-2) is a self-report 
questionnaire which includes 11 subscales plus an Anger Expression Index, as an 
overall measure of total anger expression (Spielberger et al., 1985; Italian 
validation Comunian, 2004). The subscales are: State anger, Feeling angry, Feel like 
expressing anger verbally, Feel like expressing anger physically, Trait anger, 
Angry temperament, Angry reaction, Anger expression-out, Anger expression-in, 
Anger control-out and Anger control-in. Good internal consistency for the scale is 
reported in both normal adults (α=.84 to .86) and psychiatric patients (α=.87) 
(Spielberger, 1999).  
 
Personality assessment 
The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory – III (MCMI-III) is a self-report 
designed to assess personality profile. It is made up of 175 true-false items and has 
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14 personality disorder scales, 10 clinical syndrome scales, and 4 correctional scales 
(Millon, Davis & Millon, 1997). The study focused on the fourteen personality 
disorder scales, including Schizoid, Avoidant, Depressive, Dependent, Histrionic, 
Narcissistic, Antisocial, Sadistic, Compulsive, Negativistic, Masochistic, 
Schizotypal, Borderline and Paranoid scales. These scales assess clinical areas 
according to DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for PD: higher scores indicate higher 
levels of psychopathology.  
The MCMI-III uses a Base Rate (BR) transformation score for raw score 
conversion. This is a distribution that takes into account the prevalence rate to 
maximise diagnostic efficacy (Gibertini, Brandenburg & Retzlaff, 1986; Meehl & 
Rosen, 1955). A BR >84 indicates that the patient endorses all symptoms at 
diagnostic level, so full-blown PD is possible; BR scores from 75 to 84 suggest the 
presence of clinically significant traits and sub-threshold symptoms; BR scores < 75 
are generally considered not clinically relevant. For the aims of the study, all 
patients reporting scores ≥ 75 BR were considered as endorsing clinically 
significant personality traits. The internal consistency for personality scales is 
good: Cronbach’s α for clinical personality patterns rages from .77 to .89, for severe 
personality pathology from .84 to .85 (Millon et al., 1997); in the Italian validation 
Cronbach’s α goes from .66 to .95 (Zennaro et al., 2008). The MCM-III is one of the 
most important measures, among the self-report instruments, for the assessment of 
clinically significant personality traits and personality disorders. 
 
Emotion recognition assessment 
The Facial Expressed Emotion Labelling (FEEL) test is a reliable and valid 
tool for measuring the ability to recognise facially expressed emotions.  Cronbach’s 
α for internal consistency is .77 (Kessler, Bayerl, Deighton, & Traue, 2002). This is a 
performance test. Pictures of 6 different emotions (Anger, Fear, Sadness, 
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Happiness, Surprise and Disgust) are presented on screen for 300ms. Expressions 
were taken from the JACFEE (Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of 
Emotion; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988) series. Patients read the instructions on the 
monitor. The practice trial was as follows: a neutral face was shown for 1.5s 
followed by 1s blank screen and the facial test expression. Six words (Anger, 
Anxiety, Surprise, Sadness, Happiness and Disgust) were presented with the face 
and one had to be chosen by clicking on it (forced-choice response format). 
Response time was limited to 10sec. This was followed by a written feedback 
about the correctness of the answer. Every one of the six basic emotion expressions 
was presented in this learning trial. Each participant then had the possibility to ask 
questions about the procedure. During the actual testing, the procedure was the 
same except for the feedback, that was not allowed.  
Each emotion was shown 7 times in different faces (half Caucasian and 
European, half females and males) in randomised order. In total, 42 pictures were 
shown (seven examples of all six emotions used), resulting in a maximum score of 
seven points in each emotional category and a maximum total score of the FEEL-
Test of 42 points. 
 
Longitudinal monitoring of violent behaviour 
During the one-year follow-up, every two weeks the researcher questioned 
the treating clinician or the caregiver and filled out the Modified Overt Aggression 
Scale (MOAS; Kay, Wolkenfeld & Murrill, 1988) for each patient involved in the 
study. The MOAS includes the following 4 subscales of aggression: Verbal, 
Physical, Against objectives and Self-harm behaviour. A score from 0 to 4 is 
assigned to each act, where 0 indicates no aggression and 4 denotes very severe 
aggression. In each subscale, the score is multiplied by a factor specific for the 
category, i.e. 1 for verbal aggression, 2 for aggression against objects, 3 for 
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aggression against self and 4 for aggression against other people. Therefore, the 
total weighted score ranges from 0 (no aggression) to 40 (maximum grade of 
aggression). We will subsequently refer to the weighted MOAS score simply as the 
MOAS score. In the Italian validation (Margari et al., 2005), the ICC and Pearson’s 
r coefficients are all higher than 0.9, suggesting an almost perfect concordance in 
rating, and weighted Cohen’s Kappa indices were also very high: .93 for verbal, 
property and physical aggression and .99 for self-aggression. 
All the assessment tools were selected on the basis of: extensive use in 
literature, interest in specific constructs of each instrument (according to the aims) 
and good psychometric properties. 
 
3.2.3 Procedures  
Treating clinicians selected all patients with a history of severe interpersonal 
violence, as shown by one or more of the following criteria: (i) admitted at least 
once to a Forensic Mental Hospital (FMH) for any violent acts against other 
people; (ii) arrested at least once for any violent acts against other people; (iii) 
having a documented lifetime history of violent acts against other people (as 
reported in the official clinical records). A group of patients with no history of 
violence, similar in age, gender and primary diagnosis (including the co-morbidity 
with substance or alcohol use disorders) was recruited. 
Exclusion criteria were as follows: being older than 65 years and having a 
primary diagnosis of organic mental disorder. The study was approved by the 
ethics committee of the coordinating centre (IRCCS Saint John of God 
Fatebenefratelli Clinical Research Centre) and the ethics committees of all the other 
recruiting centres.  
After selection by the treating clinicians, each patient was contacted by the 
researcher for an in-depth explanation of the project and signature of informed 
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consent. Patients then received subsequent appointments for the administration of 
all the instruments. In particular, for the Metacognitive Assessment Interview, 
patients signed a separate consent, because the interview was audio recorded in 
order to calculate the scoring. Each assessment session lasted 60-90 minutes. 
All researchers attended an initial training related to the proper 
administration of the instruments used in the project. All self-report instruments 
were filled out with the attendance of a researcher available to explain each item 
and assist patients if necessary. 
In the longitudinal phase of the study regarding the monitoring of 
aggressive behaviours through the fill-out of the MOAS, researchers contacted the 
patient's treating clinician or his/her caregiver every fifteen days.  
At the end of each patient's assessment, researchers filled out an online 
database, built specifically for the project, with predefined variables, in order to 
ensure homogeneity and minimise errors in data collection. 
 
3.2.4  Statistical analysis 
When the two groups, PM patients and GM patients, were compared in 
relation to categorical variables (sociodemographic and clinical characteristics or 
the history of violence) the Chi-Square test (or Fisher Exact test if there were cells 
with a number less than 5) was used to analyse the differences between groups in 
certain categories. Instead, when the two groups were confronted about 
quantitative variables (i.e. quantitative sociodemographic and clinical 
characteristics, BIS-11 and BDHI) the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
performed to analyse the differences in the means (and standard deviations) 
between the two groups. 
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The distribution of data for each variable was evaluated and if the 
distribution was not normal (i.e. FEEL, MCMI-III, STAXI-2 and MOAS), the Mann-
Whitney non-parametric test was utilised.  
Monitoring of violent behaviour was performed by analysing the MOAS 
total score and MOAS subscales across the 24 time-points during follow-up 
through smoothing-splines for trend estimation (Ramsay & Silverman, 2005).  
Predictors of aggressive behaviour were tested by performing Generalized 
Linear Models (GLMs, with tweedie distribution and log-link function); the MOAS 
total score was entered as the dependent variable and continuous and categorical 
measures, as well as interaction between metacognitive group and predictors, 
included as independent variables. 
In order to investigate whether the sociodemographic and clinical variables 
which differed between two groups (PM and GM), i.e. ‘age’, ‘education level’, 
‘disorder duration’, ‘age of the first contact with services’, influence results, 
correlations between these variables and outcomes of all the measures (FEEL, 
MCMI-III, BDHI, BIS-11, STAXI-2, MOAS) were carried out (see Appendix 2). 
When correlations between outcomes and one or more the abovementioned 
variables were present, the analyses were corrected using them as covariates 
(ANCOVA for variable with normal distribution and GLMs for variable without 
normal distribution and for predictive models) that also included the correlated 
variables. Data showed that even after the adjustment of values, the presence or 
absence of statistical significance of all the results was not altered by the Age, 
Education level, Disorder duration and Age of the first contact with services 
variables, which were therefore not confounding factors. For further details, see 
Appendix 2.  
All tests were two-tailed, with the statistically significant level set at p=< .05. 
All data was coded and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Science 
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(SPSS, version 23) and R: A language and environment for statistical computing, 
(R Core Team, 2015). 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1  Metacognition and history of violence 
PM patients reported a history of violence more frequently than GM patients 
(considering the MAI total score). Therefore, the differences in specific 
metacognitive functions, assessed with the MAI, were analysed.  
Consequently, the sample was again split based on the levels (Poor 
Metacognition=<2.5 or Good Metacognition=>2.5) of the 4 specific metacognitive 
functions and the presence of patients with a history of violence in the two groups 
was compared for each function. 
As Table 4 shows, the patients with a poor level of metacognition in 
monitoring, differentiating and decentring displayed a history of violence more 
frequently than patients with a good level of metacognition in the same functions. 
Table 4. Differences in metacognitive functions between patients with and 
without history of violence 
History of violence PM 
N(%) 
GM 
N(%) 
Χ2 p-value 
  Total Matacognition 
Yes 58 (66.7) 38 (40.9) 12.03 .001 
No 29 (33.3) 55 (59.1) 
 Monitoring 
Yes 30 (68.2) 66 (48.5) 5.16 .023 
No 14 (31.8) 70 (51.5) 
 Differentiating 
Yes 52 (65.0) 44 (44.0) 7.88 .005 
No 28 (35.0) 56 (56.0) 
 Integrating 
Yes 50 (60.2) 46 (47.4) 2.95 .086 
No 33 (39.8) 51 (52.6) 
 Decentring 
Yes 60 (65.9) 36 (40.4) 11.74 .001 
No 31 (34.1) 53 (59.6) 
* The Chi-square test  
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3.3.2  Metacognition and emotion recognition  
In the skill of emotional recognition through face expression, assessed with 
FEEL, PM patients reported lower total scores than GM patients. In particular, the 
PM group showed worse performances in recognising the following emotions: 
anger, sadness, and joy (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Differences in emotion recognition between PM patients and GM 
patients 
Facially Expressed 
Emotion Labeling test 
(FEEL) 
PM 
M(SD) 
GM 
M(SD) 
U* p-value 
TOT. 30.4 (6.0) 33.5 (5.9) 4603.5 .011** 
Sadness 4.7 (1.8) 5.7 (1.7) 4617 .013*° 
Anger 3.8 (2.1) 4.6 (2.1) 4191.5 .014 
Disgust 5.2 (1.7) 5.6 (1.8) 3961 .808°* 
Fear 4.6 (2.0) 5.0 (1.9) 3880.5 .472° 
Joy 6.4 (0.8) 6.6 (0.8) 3966 .039 
Surprise 5.7 (1.5) 5.9 (1.5) 3835.5 .179 
*The Non-Parametric U-Mann-Whitney test  
*°Adjusted values for ‘Age’ and ‘Disorder Duration’ through GLMs  
°*Adjusted values for ‘Disorder Duration’ through GLMs 
°Adjusted values for ‘Age’ through GLMs 
**Adjusted values for ‘Age’ and ‘Disorder Duration’ through GLMs  
 
3.3.3 Metacognition and personality traits 
As far as personality traits are concerned, PM patients showed higher scores 
than GM patients in the Narcissistic and Paranoid scales (Table 6). Furthermore, to 
evaluate only the clinically significant traits, the presence of patients who exceeded 
the cut-off of 75 BR (indicating clinically significant traits) was compared between 
the two groups: PM patients reported clinically significant Narcissistic and 
Paranoid traits more frequently than GM patients (Narcissistic: 33% of PM group 
vs 18% of GM group; Χ2=5.040, p=.029; Paranoid: 23% of PM group vs 16% of GM 
group; Χ2=3.067, p=.055). In all PD subscales no differences were found (p>.05) . 
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Table 6. Differences in personality traits between PM patients and GM patients 
MCMI-III PM 
M(DS) 
GM 
M(DS) 
U* p-value 
Schizoid 54.4 (20.1) 57.2 (25.1) 3.407 .375 
Avoidant 51.1 (28.7) 54.1 (28.5) 3.390,5 .406 
Depressive 47.3 (28.6) 50.9 (29.1) 3.421 .350 
Dependent 50.1 (29.5) 51.8 (27.7) 3.213 .828 
Histrionic 60.8 (24.8) 54.6 (24.9) 2.786,5 .210 
Narcissistic 65.0 (23.4) 57.3 (21.5) 2.580,5 .049 
Antisocial 55.2 (20.9) 54.7 (19.8) 3.134 .956 
Sadistic 45.6 (20.0) 43.6 (21.1) 2.969,5 .533 
Compulsive 76.5 (26.1) 71.6 (27.2) 2.817,5 .251 
Negativistic (Passive-aggressive) 54.6 (23.8) 51.2 (29.8) 3.012 .634 
Masochistic (Self-Defeating) 38.5 (24.2) 38.5 (24.7) 3.087,5 .829 
Schizotypal 47.7 (27.2) 47.5 (26.3) 3.085 .822 
Borderline  47.8 (32.3) 50.5 (28.9) 3.321,5 .554 
Paranoid 62.8 (23.3) 55.3 (25.5) 2.396 .009 
*The Non-Parametric U-Mann-Whitney Test  
 
3.3.4  Metacognition,  anger, impulsivity and hostility 
With regard to the evaluation of hostility, impulsivity and anger (assessed 
respectively by means of the BDHI, BIS-11 and STAXI-2) in relation to 
metacognitive functions, there were no significant differences between the two 
groups, except for the Negativism subscale of the BDHI instrument. In this case, 
the PM group (M=3.1) showed higher scores than the GM group (M=2.6) (p=.03, 
see Tables 8, 9 and 10). 
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Table 8. Differences in hostility between PM patients and GM patients 
BDHI PM 
M(DS) 
GM 
M(DS) 
F* p-value* 
Assault  4.0 (2.3) 3.6 (2.2) 9.250 .587** 
Indirect aggression 4.5 (2.0) 4.6 (2.0) .119 .730 
Irritability 4.4 (2.7) 4.2 (2.5) .220 .639 
Negativism 3.1 (1.5) 2.6 (1.4) 4.780 .030 
Resentment 3.4 (2.1) 3.5 (2.0) .037 .849 
Suspicion 4.5 (2.4) 4.2 (2.6) .635 .991*° 
Verbal aggression 6.8 (2.5) 6.4 (2.5) 1.421 .235 
Guilt 5.0 (2.2) 4.9 (2.4) .088 .767 
Total score  33.0 (12.0) 31.7 (11.9) .453 .502 
* The ANOVA 
**Adjusted values for ‘Education Level’ through ANCOVA  
*°Adjusted values for ‘Disorder Duration’ through ANCOVA 
 
Table 9. Differences in impulsiveness between PM patients and GM patients 
BIS-11 PM 
M(DS) 
GM 
M(DS) 
F* p-value 
Cognitive impulsiveness 15.3 (4.5) 15.3 (4.1) 0.001 .971 
Motor impulsiveness 22.6 (4.9) 21.8 (4.9) 1.339 .249 
Non planning impulsiveness 27.2 (5.1) 27.6 (5.0) .270 .604 
Totale 65.1 (11.4) 64.5 (11.6) .144 .705 
* The ANOVA  
 
Table 10. Differences in anger between PM patients and GM patients 
STAXI-2 PM 
M(DS) 
GM 
M(DS) 
U* p-value 
State anger 18.6 (6.9) 18.1 (6.4) 3568.5 .167** 
Feeling angry 6.5 (2.5) 6.4 (2.6) 3537 .429** 
Feel like expressing anger verbally  6.4 (2.9) 6.2 (2.9) 3682 .712 
Feel like expressing anger physically 5.7 (2.2) 5.5 (1.7) 3888 .924 
Trait anger 17.6 (7.0) 18.2 (6.5) 4077.5 .716*° 
Angry temperament 6.4 (2.7) 6.9 (2.7) 4248 .946*° 
Angry reaction 7.7 (3.4) 7.9 (3.1) 4167 .371 
Anger expression-out 15.1 (5.5) 13.9 (4.6) 3379 .184 
Anger expression-in 17.5 (5.5) 17.3 (5.3) 3653 .796 
Anger control-out 20.0 (4.9) 20.5 (5.2) 4016.5 .475 
Anger control-in 21.9 (5.7) 22.7 (5.3) 4038 .356 
Anger expression Index 38.3 (14.7) 35.7 (15.3) 3143 .276 
*The Non-Parametric U-Mann-Whitney Test  
**Adjusted values for ‘Age’ through GLMs  
*°Adjusted values for ‘Age’ and ‘Disorder Duration’ through GLMs 
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3.3.5  Metacognition and aggressive behaviour during one-year follow-up  
When comparing aggressive behaviour observed during the one-year follow-
up, no significant differences emerged between PM and GM groups in the average 
MOAS scores, in both the total scores and the 4 subscales scores, related to the 
different types of aggressiveness: Verbal, Against objects, Self-aggression and 
Against people (Table 11).  
Furthermore, in order to identify the most aggressive patients, the presence 
of individuals with a total MOAS>16 (third quartile) in the two groups (PM and 
GM) was compared, and also in this case significant difference between PM 
patients and GM patients did not emerge (PM=24% vs GM=27%, Χ2=.216, p= .730). 
 
Table 11. Differences in aggressive behaviour during one-year follow-up 
between PM patients and GM patients 
MOAS 
Aggressive behaviours 
PM 
Mean (SD) 
GM 
Mean(SD) 
Test *p-value 
Verbal 5.6 (9.8) 5.4 (8.6) 3837.5 .226*° 
Against objects 2.7 (8.0) 2.9 (5.5) 4094.5 .505*° 
Self-aggression 1.5 (6.7) 2.2 (7.7) 3907 .637 
Against people 2.6 (6.6) 4.7 (13.9) 3986 .418** 
TOT. 12.5 (24.2) 15.2 (27.6) 4102.5 .905*° 
*The Non-Parametric U-Mann-Whitney Test  
**Adjusted values for ‘Age’ through GLMs  
*°Adjusted values for ‘Age’ and ‘Disorder Duration’ through GLMs 
 
 
The trend of the 24 evaluations (over 12 months) of aggressive behaviour in 
the two groups was analysed: significant differences were not found. The 
confidence bands (grey bands) of the two groups in all the figures overlap and this 
indicates that the trends of the two groups did not differ (Figure 1). These analyses 
were conducted on the total score (figure 1) and on 4 subscales: verbal (figure 2), 
against objects (figure 3), self-aggression (figure 4), against people (figure 5).  The 
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figure shows that the trends of the two groups were both very fluctuating and 
irregular during the entire follow-up period. 
 
Figure 1. Trends of the MOAS total scores during one-year follow-up in PM and 
GM patients 
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Figure 2. Trends of the MOAS verbal aggression scores during 1-year f.u. in the 
PM patients and GM patients 
 
 
Figure 3. Trends of the MOAS aggression against objects scores during 1-year 
f.u. in the PM patients and GM patients 
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Figure 4.  Trends of the MOAS self-aggression scores during 1-year f.u. in the 
PM patients and GM patients 
 
 
Figure 5.  Trends of the MOAS aggression against people scores during 1-year 
f.u. in the PM patients and GM patients 
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3.3.6 Predictors of aggressive behaviour and the role of the metacognitive 
functions 
In order to assess whether there is any predictive factor of the aggressive 
behaviour displayed during the follow-up by the patients, the dimensions 
evaluated in this study were analysed using GLM: metacognition, history of 
violence, care setting, psychopathology, anger, hostility, impulsivity, emotion 
recognition and personality traits. These analyses indicate that with the growth of 
one unit (score) of the quantitative variables, or with the presence (or absence) of 
the categorical variables, the mean increment (or decrease) of the MOAS mean 
total score (13.94) is equal to exp(β). Therefore, in this paragraph, the MOAS score 
refers to the MOAS mean total score. 
Data showed that the significant predictive variables of aggressive behaviour 
(MOAS scores) were the following (Table 12). The strongest predictors were 
Borderline and Passive-Aggressive (Negativistic) personality traits; in particular, 
the presence of these traits forecast a mean increase of the MOAS score, 
respectively, of 211% (exp(β)=2.11) and 92% (exp(β)=1.92). Meanwhile, 
Compulsive and Histrionic traits were related to a mean decrease of the MOAS 
score respectively of 42% (exp(β)=0.58) and 43%(exp(β)=0.57). 
Similarly, the history of violence was a very important predictor: the 
presence of a history of violence led to a mean increase of the MOAS score by 86% 
(exp(β)=1.86). 
The BDHI total score and all its subscales, except for Guilt, resulted as 
predictive factors. With the unit rise of these subscales, the MOAS score’s mean 
increases are: 5% for Total Score (exp(β)=1.05); 17% for Assault (exp(β)=1.17); 28% 
for Indirect aggression (exp(β)=1.28); 25% for Irritability (exp(β)=1.25); 17% for 
Negativism (exp(β)=1.17); 22% for Resentment (exp(β)=1.22); 22% for Suspicion 
(exp(β)=1.22); and 20% for Verbal aggression (exp(β)=1.20). 
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Also, the Hostility-Suspicion subscale of the BPRS is a predictive factor: the 
unit rise of this scale produces a mean increase of the MOAS score by 12% 
(exp(β)=1.12).   
Regarding emotion recognition by facial expressions, the unit increment of 
fear recognition in the FEEL test corresponded to a mean decrease by 11% 
(exp(β)=0.89) in the MOAS score. 
Finally, several subscales of the STAXI-2 were predictive dimensions of 
aggressive behaviour. Data showed that unit growth in the following subscales 
corresponded to mean increases of the MOAS score, specifically: 7% for Trait 
anger (exp(β)=1.07); 11% for Angry reaction (exp(β)=1.11); 19% for Angry 
temperament (exp(β)=1.19); and 6% for Anger expression-out (exp(β)=1.06). 
The metacognition alone did not emerge as a predictive factor of aggressive 
behaviour. Nevertheless, the potential role of metacognitive functions to predict 
aggressive behaviour was evaluated through the analysis of the interaction 
between these functions (considering both the GM group and the PM group) and 
all the aspects assessed in this study. Metacognitive functions displayed a 
significant interaction with the following variables: BDHI-Assault, BDHI-Indirect 
aggression and STAXI-2-Anger reaction (Table 13). Through a more in-depth 
analysis aimed at understanding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of this 
interaction in predicting aggressive behaviour, the beta coefficients for the two 
metacognitive groups (PM and GM) were calculated separately (Table 14). The 
data showed a very important result: the abovementioned variables that interacted 
with metacognition emerged as significant predictors of aggressive behaviour only 
for patients with poor metacognition. Indeed, in PM patients the unitincrement in 
the scores of BDHI-Assault, BDHI-Indirect aggression and STAXI-2-Anger reaction 
led to a mean increase of the MOAS total score (12.49), respectively, by 36% 
(exp(β)=1.36), 53% (exp(β)=1.53) and 21% (exp(β)=1.21). Conversely, these 
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variables did not predict aggressive behaviour in patients with good 
metacognition. In the cases of two dimensions of the BDHI, the adjustment 
analyses for the Age and Disorder duration variables (which differed in the two 
groups and when correlated with MOAS scores) showed that, despite the 
interaction of metacognitive functions with the two dimensions of BDHI in 
predicting aggressive behaviour not being influenced by above variables since the 
interaction remains significant, Age was a significant variable, therefore it plays a 
role in the prediction of aggressive behaviour. For further details, see Appendix 2. 
 
Table 12. Predictive factors of aggressive behaviour during one-year follow-up 
 
               p-value exp(β) 
MAI (PM vs GM) .376 .82 
History of violence (Yes vs No) .006 1.86 
BDHI   
Total Score <.001 1.05 
Assault .003 1.17 
Inderect aggression <.001 1.28 
Irritability <.001 1.25 
Negativism .051 1.17 
Resentment .001 1.22 
Suspicion <.001 1.22 
Verbal aggression <.001 1.20 
STAXI-2 
  
Trait anger <.001 1.07 
Angry reaction .002 1.11 
Angry temperament <.001 1.19 
Anger expression-out .014 1.06 
FEEL   
Fear .030 .89 
BPRS 
  
Hostility Suspicion .002 1.12 
MCMI-III 
  
Compulsive (Yes vs No) .018 .58 
Passive-Aggressive (Yes vs No) .008 1.92 
Borderline (Yes vs No) .002 2.11 
Histrionic (Yes vs No) .048 .57 
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Table 13. Interaction of metacognitive functions in predicting aggressive 
behaviour 
  p-value 
BDHI Assault .001** 
Metacognition (groups) .006** 
Interaction .005** 
BDHI Inderect aggression .000** 
Metacognition (groups) .024** 
Interaction .017** 
STAXI Angry reaction .003** 
Metacognition (groups) .005** 
Interaction .012** 
** Adjusted values for ‘Age’ and ‘Disorder Duration’ through GLMs  
*° Adjusted values for ‘Age’ through GLMs 
 
Table 14. Variables that interact with metacognitive functions in predicting 
aggressive behaviour in the two groups (PM and GM) 
 PM GM 
 p value exp(β) p value exp(β) 
BDHI Assault <.001 1.36 .293 1.08 
BDHI Inderect aggression <.001 1.53 .054 1.16 
STAXI Angry reaction <.001 1.21 .287 1.05 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Several studies have attempted to investigate the relationship between 
severe mental disorders and the risk of violence (Nederlof, Muris, & Hovens, 
2013). People with severe mental disorders are more likely to commit violent acts 
than healthy controls from the general population (Volavka, 2014). Nevertheless, 
most individuals suffering from mental disorders do not perform aggressive 
behaviour, and most aggressive behaviour are not performed by individuals with 
diagnosed mental disorders (Glied & Frank, 2014).  
The present study focused on metacognitive functioning as a potential 
discriminating aspect between patients with mental disorders who commit 
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aggressive behaviour and patients with the same disorders that do not commit 
such acts (Abu-Akel & Abushua’leh, 2004; Bo et al., 2015; Fonagy & Levinson, 
2004). Furthermore, other important aspects suggested by literature, as potentially 
involved in aggressive behaviour, were considered together with metacognition: 
personality traits (Bateman & Fonagy, 2010; Coid, 2002; Fountoulakis et al., 2008; 
Howard et al., 2008; McGauley et al., 2013; Reid & Thorne, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory et 
al., 2010; Taubner et al., 2013); emotion recognition (Blair, 2004; Dawel et al. 2012; 
Glass & Newman, 2006; Marsh & Blair, 2008; Wegrzyn et al., 2017); and anger, 
impulsivity and hostility (Birkley & Eckhardt, 2015; Garofalo et al., 2016; 
Norlander and Eckhardt, 2005; Ramírez & Andreu, 2006; Rubio-Garay et al., 2016; 
Wegrzyn et al., 2017). 
 
3.4.1  Metacognition and history of violence 
The current study demonstrated that patients with poor levels of 
metacognitive functioning reported a more frequent history of physical violence 
against other people compared to patients with a good metacognitive functioning. 
In particular, the history of violence has been reported more frequently in patients 
with poor metacognition levels in specific functions (3 out of 4 functions). 
The first function is Monitoring, which regards the skills of understanding 
and recognising one's own internal states, such as thoughts, emotions and bodily 
sensations. Patients with poor monitoring function have difficulties in recognising, 
verbalising and processing their internal states, especially negative ones, such as 
those arising from interpersonal conflicts, and have difficulty in referring their 
emotions to clear thoughts and in relating these mental states with the behaviour 
to act consistently with one's own goals. For this reason, patients with poor 
monitoring might be more likely to display these thoughts and emotions through 
aggressive physical behaviour against others compared to patients with a good 
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monitoring. To act out their internal states becomes the only pathway for patients 
with poor monitoring to express them. 
 The second function is Differentiating, which concerns two abilities: 
1) the differentiation of the external reality from other internal representations 
such as thoughts and dreams, etc.; 2) the consideration of one's own point of view 
as subjective and not universal and absolute. Also patients with poor 
differentiating reported violent behaviour in the past more frequently than 
patients with a good level of this skill; these patients are not able to consider 
alternative points of view to understand events of daily life, they deem their point 
of view as the only possible and proper interpretation of reality; moreover, these 
patients could also confuse their various mental representations with external 
realty (that could lead to psychotic symptoms), and perceive imagined threats as 
real; therefore, it is evident that patients with a deficit in these abilities might be 
more likely to commit violent acts than patients with good differentiation.  
Finally, the Decentring function consists of the ability to understand and 
represent the internal states of others, in terms of thoughts, emotions and 
motivations. In the current study, decentring dysfunctions show the strongest 
evidence in favour of the link between metacognitive deficits and history of 
violence; indeed, the number of patients with poor decentring who have 
committed violence in the past is higher than in all the other functions. Especially 
in this case, it is evident that patients who have difficulty recognising and 
comprehending others’ thoughts, emotions and motivations were more likely to be 
led towards violent acts, because they always placed focus on themselves and 
interpreted many situations as hostile and antagonistic to themselves.  
These results, indicating a strong association between a poor (or absent) 
metacognitive functioning and history of physical violence, are consistent with 
clinical observations and with literature. Indeed, other studies support the 
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relationship between metacognitive dysfunctions and violence (Abu-Akel & 
Abushua’leh, 2004; Fonagy & Levinson, 2004). However, evidence about this topic 
is limited and contradictory: some authors have found a better metacognitive 
functioning (in specific abilities like understanding others’ minds) in violent 
patients (in particular psychopathic patients), compared to non-violent patients, in 
aiming to manipulate and harm their victims (Abu-Akel et al., 2015).  
Although the metacognition assessment occurred some years after the 
violence enacted by patients, the stability of metacognitive functions is reported in 
the literature (Dimaggio & Stiles, 2007; Lysaker et al., 2011d; Semerari et al., 2003b) 
and it is evident from the clinical observation. Unless a patient undergoes 
psychotherapy that could (when treatment is effective) partly improve these skills, 
metacognitive functions tend to remain stable over time.  
It is also important to note that the data of the present study, according to 
other research (Fonagy & Levinson, 2004; Lysaker et al., 2005c; Mitchell et al., 
2012), suggests that patients with mental disorders displayed an overall 
impairment in metacognitive functioning. Indeed, the levels of metacognitive 
functions of all the patients recruited were rated within the “poor” (PM group) 
and “good” (GM group) range, and never reached “very good” or “sophisticated.” 
 
3.4.2 Relationship between metacognition and personality traits, emotion 
recognition, anger, impulsivity and hostility 
In relation to emotion recognition, the findings indicate that patients with a 
poor metacognitive functioning displayed greater difficulties in recognising 
facially expressed emotions compared to patients with good metacognition.  
The link between poor metacognitive functioning and the difficulty in 
recognising emotions is clinically observable and consistent. The recognition of 
emotions felt by others through facial expressions is closely related to 
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metacognition, in particular to Decentring; both dimensions refer to the ability of 
understanding emotions felt by others. In this sense, emotional recognition could 
be considered a part of Decentring. Metacognition includes both awareness of 
specific elements such as naming an emotion one experiences or inferring other 
people’s thoughts from facial expressions or behaviour, to more synthetic 
judgements integrating psychological knowledge about the self and others into 
complex psychological representations (Carcione et al., 2011; Dimaggio & Lysaker, 
2010; Lysaker et al., 2013b; Semerari et al., 2003a,b). Therefore, it is evident that 
metacognitive functioning and emotion recognition through facial expressions are 
involved in a two-way reciprocal relationship, although these abilities are not 
overlying and remain partially independent. The results are also consistent with 
Lysaker and colleagues (2014d), who revealed that greater deficits in mental state 
decoding, mental state reasoning and metacognitive abilities were related to 
deficits in the emotional recognition capacity.  
With regard to the personality dimensions assessed with MCMI-III, patients 
with a poor metacognitive functioning reported more narcissistic and paranoid 
traits than patients with good functioning. Through the clinical observation, it is 
clear that patients with narcissistic and paranoid personality disorders have 
especially huge problems in metacognitive functions referred to in the Other 
domain, i.e. differentiating and decentring. 
Unexpectedly, no differences emerged in other personality dimensions. A 
possible explanation is that the assessment tool of the personality dimensions 
(MCMI-III) is a self-report, and this could lead to an underestimation of the 
pathological traits. This is more likely in patients with greater metacognitive 
deficits. Moreover, other research has focused on samples of patients with 
personality disorders, while in this research the sample was heterogeneous. 
Finally, the present analysis focused on personality traits and not personality 
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disorders. Contrary to these results, literature demonstrated that all personality 
disorders are associated with metacognitive dysfunctions and these deficits 
represent a key aspect in personality pathologies; in particular, personality 
disorders are constituted on the basis of the metacognitive profiles (Dimaggio et 
al., 2009b; Moroni et al., 2016; Semerari et al. 2005; 2007; 2014; 2015). Indeed, 
patients with different PDs seem to present diversified profiles of metacognitive 
impairments: patients with avoidant personality disorder and narcissistic 
personality disorder, for example, showed low ability to monitor their own 
emotions (Dimaggio et al., 2007), while patients with borderline personality 
disorder had more preserved monitoring but exhibited a lack of integration and 
poor differentiation (Semerari et al., 2005). 
In relation to the hostility feature, no differences emerged between patients 
with poor and good levels of metacognition, except for feelings of hostility and 
rancour towards others (the Negativism subscale of the BDHI). 
Garofalo and colleagues (2016) indicate that the tendency to perceive the 
world as hostile consists above all in perceiving others as hostile, without 
adequately considering the information coming from the people and the 
environment. This explanation is consistent with the fact as patients with a poor 
metacognitive functioning may not be able to understand the mental states of 
others (and differentiate them from their own), and they might tend to interpret all 
events (and people’s intentions) in a harsh and pervasive way, as threats to 
themselves. This could lead them to being hostile against a hostile world. 
With regard to anger and impulsivity aspects (and other subscales of BDHI), 
no differences were found between patients with poor and good metacognitive 
functioning.  
Despite these findings, clinical observations suggest that patients with poor 
metacognitive functioning might experience higher levels of anger, impulsivity 
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and hostility (as discussed above) compared to patients with good metacognition, 
because the former may not be able to recognise and elaborate their thoughts, or 
comprehend others’ actions, and are more likely to be unable to regulate their 
emotions. 
Nevertheless, clinical experiences have shown that also patients with a good 
metacognitive functioning might feel high levels of anger, impulsivity and 
hostility; in these cases, patients can use their metacognitive functions in order to 
understand their own and others’ perspectives, and regulate their emotions. 
The few studies that have dealt with the relationship between metacognition 
and anger have indicated the potential role of metacognitive beliefs in predicting 
anger and rumination prospectively (Caselli et al., 2017; Simpson & Papageorgiou, 
2003). 
 
3.4.3 Predictors of aggressive behaviour and the role of metacognitive functions 
The aggressive behaviour shown by patients during the one-year follow-up 
was not different between patients with a poor metacognition and those with a 
good metacognition. This result emerged both in the MOAS mean scores and the 
MOAS trends, which included all 24 evaluations across time. These findings were 
observed in all 4 subscales that referred to the different types of aggression 
(Verbal, Against object, Against people, Self-aggression).  
In general, the number and severity of aggressions of all the patients was 
limited: indeed, the average in the 12 months of the MOAS is 13.9 (in relation to a 
range which goes from 0 to 960) and is, for the most part, constituted by verbal 
aggressive behaviour. Obviously, on the one hand this is a positive outcome, 
which suggests that patients under the care of Mental Health Services are not 
particularly aggressive; on the other hand, the low number of aggressions could 
partially interfere to detect significant differences between the two groups. 
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Despite these results, a systematic review found that metacognition, and 
other dimensions such as psychotic symptoms, personality factors and substance 
use, may be linked to an increased risk of violence. In particular, it suggested that 
specific metacognitive profiles could be associated with the occurrence of violence 
in patients with schizophrenia (Bo, Abu-Akel, Kongerslev, Haahr, and Simonsen, 
2011). Moreover, Taubner and colleagues (2016) demonstrated that metacognitive 
skills are mediators for the risk of violence in adolescents who were victims of 
child maltreatment. Unfortunately, there is no research on patients with other 
mental disorders that investigate the metacognitive functions in relation to the risk 
of violence; for this reason, future studies are recommended. 
For the present study, patients were observed and monitored in two very 
different settings: some patients lived in residential facilities and others lived at 
home and attended monthly outpatient’s visits. Consequently, this aspect could 
make the observation of aggressive behaviour more complex, because the chance 
and the risk of enacting violence in two distinct settings might be different; 
however, this variable was considered in the analyses and the result showed that 
setting did not significantly interfere with the prediction of aggressive behaviour. 
However, in the VIORMED project (Barlati et al., submitted), regarding the risk of 
aggressive behaviour in relation to the history of violence, outpatients with a 
history of violence were more likely to have violent recurrences than inpatients 
with such history. 
The strongest predictors of aggressive behaviour during follow-up were the 
Borderline and Passive-Aggressive personality traits and the history of violence, 
while metacognition alone did not predict aggressive behaviour. 
The importance of personality traits as risk factors for aggressive behaviour 
has been demonstrated by numerous studies. The previous studies related to the 
VIORMED project have already revealed that in the outpatients sample, the 
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following personality traits were predictors of aggressive behaviours: depressive, 
sadistic, passive-aggressive, schizotypal, borderline, and compulsive (Bottesi et al., 
submitted). Meanwhile, in an inpatients sample, Candini and colleagues (2017) 
found that the antisocial personality traits were strong predictors of aggressive 
behaviour. Other research has confirmed these results. For instance, two recent 
studies demonstrated that antisocial PD increases the rate of recidivism of violence 
among people with mental disorders (Coid, Ullrich, Bebbington, Fazel & Keers, 
2016; Shepherd, Campbell & Ogloff, 2016).   
In general, PDs are very common in different offending populations and 
there is evidence about the prominent role played by PDs and maladaptive 
personality traits in the risk of aggressive behaviour (Bo et al., 2013; Howard et al., 
2008; Huber, Hochstrasser, Meister, Schimmelmann, & Lambert, 2016; Newhill 
Eack & Mulvey, 2009; Nolan et al., 2003; Terzi et al., 2017; Volavka, 2014). In a 
recent meta-analysis, Yu, Geddes & Fazel (2012) reported that offenders with any 
PD had two to three times higher odds of being repeat offenders than mentally ill 
offenders with no PD or non–mentally disordered offenders.  
Literature has shown that the personality disorders most frequently 
associated with violence are those belonging to cluster B (Bo et al., 2013; Moran & 
Hodgins, 2004; Mueser et al., 1997), particularly the antisocial and borderline ones 
(Howard et al., 2008). Furthermore, for the current study, a very interesting aspect 
is that these disorders were clearly linked to metacognitive deficits in previous 
studies: both borderline (Bateman & Fonagy, 2010; Semerari et al., 2015) and 
antisocial patients (Fonagy, 2004; McGauley et al., 2013; Taubner et al., 2013) 
showed an impaired metacognitive functioning, characterised by perspective-
taking problems and difficulty in understanding others’ mental states. These 
disorders share several pathological dimensions: marked impulsivity and 
unpredictability, difficulties with emotional regulation and anger control, 
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disregard for safety of self, and behaviour that can be considered by others to 
appear manipulative (Bateman et al., 2016). On the contrary, the passive-
aggressive traits were less associated with the risk of interpersonal violence: 
individuals with passive-aggressive traits would be more emotionally unstable 
and complaining and more often tend to express aggression through indirect 
behaviour followed by confessions of regret (Craig, 2003; Millon & Davis, 1997). 
One possible explanation of the reason why in the present study the passive-
aggressive trait emerges as a risk factor for aggressive behaviour, is that this trait is 
an indirect feature of aggression and is probably less affected by the bias of social 
desirability, typical of the self-report measure. 
Another strong predictor of aggressive behaviour is the history of violence. 
This result is confirmed by other studies of the VIORMED project (Bulgari et al. 
2016; Candini et al., 2017; de Girolamo et al, 2016) and by numerous studies on 
patients with mental disorders and/or offenders that demonstrated the crucial role 
played by the history of violence in increasing rates of violence recidivism among 
individuals with past aggressive behaviour (Fazel, Buxrud, Ruchkin, & Grann, 
2010; Fazel, Gulati, Linsell, Geddes, & Grann, 2009; Lund, Hofvander, Forsman, 
Anckarsa ̈ter, & Nilsson, 2013; Swogger, Walsh, Houston, Cashman-Brown, & 
Conner, 2010). At the same time, the very important finding of the present study is 
that people with history of violence are characterised more frequently by poor 
metacognitive functioning compared to patients without such history. The data is 
supported by other studies (Abu-Akel and Abushualeh, 2004; Fonagy & Levinson, 
2004). Therefore, despite metacognition alone not being a predictor of aggressive 
behaviour, it is important to note that the history of violence, which was found to 
predict aggressive behaviour, is more frequent in people with metacognitive 
deficits. 
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Thus, metacognitive deficits are associated with history of violence, which in 
turn increases the risk of committing aggressive behaviour. 
In addition, hostility being a predictor of aggressive behaviour is in line with 
the literature showing that the hostility dimension is strictly related to violence 
(Birkley & Eckhardt, 2015; Norlander & Eckhardt, 2005; Ramirez & Andreu, 2006). 
This result emerged in both the BDHI questionnaire and the Hostility-Suspicion 
dimension of the BPRS instrument, and is consistent with the clinical observation. 
The tendency to perceive the world and individuals as hostile is a feature of 
psychological functioning that might be a strong predictor of violent behaviour 
(Garofalo et al. 2016). Indeed, if everything is interpreted as a threat, hostility and 
suspicion are consequent and ‘legitimate’, and the attack-defence reaction (even 
through aggressive behaviour) is more likely. 
The anger dimension was also found to be a predictor of aggressive 
behaviour. A recent meta-analytic review confirmed a robust relationship between 
anger and violent behaviour (Cheriji, Pineta & David, 2013); other authors have 
demonstrated the fundamental role played by anger in the risk of violence 
(Norlander & Eckhardt, 2005; Stefanile, Matera, Nerini, Puddu, & Raffagnino, 
2017) and, in this direction, a recent review suggested that anger treatments are 
moderately effective in the reduction of aggression (Lee & DiGiuseppe, 2018). 
Finally, the present research showed the role of metacognitive functions 
associated with other variables that predict aggressive behaviour. Indeed, 
metacognitive functions interact with hostility manifested through direct and 
indirect aggression (two BDHI subscales), and with angry reaction through 
aggressive behaviour (one STAXI-2 subscale). In particular, these variables 
emerged as predictors of aggressive behaviour only in patients with poor 
metacognitive functioning. This means that these variables are predictive of 
aggressive behaviour only if they are associated with poor metacognition. The 
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latter result is very important to note because it leads to a relevant conclusion, 
already supported by clinical observation. Some dimensions strongly linked to 
aggressive behaviour, such as hostility and anger, are not predictors per se, but 
they become risk factors when metacognitive capacities are impaired and the 
person fails to express such internal states in an adaptive way. The lack of 
processing and regulation of some internal states thanks to good metacognitive 
abilities could even lead to aggressive behaviour. At the same time, metacognitive 
functions might be considered as protective factors towards aggressive behaviour, 
reducing the aggressive value of some aspects (for example hostility and anger). 
In line with these findings, there is also evidence showing that psychosocial 
and metacognitive skills such as empathising and understanding the perspective 
of others are associated with reduced aggressive behaviour (Abu-Akel & 
Abushualeh, 2004; Flight & Forth, 2007; Woodworth & Porter, 2002). 
However, the literature concerning metacognitive functions as predictors 
and/or relevant variables in relation to the risk of aggressive behaviour is still very 
limited; for this reason and taking into account the obvious relevance of the topic, 
further studies are recommended. 
   
3.5 Limitations and future directions 
This research presents some limitations. The first is the sample size; in 
particular for the longitudinal evaluation of aggressive behaviour, the number of 
patients and consequently the number of their aggressive behaviour during the 
follow-up was rather small. With regard to this aspect, also the length of the 
follow-up was limited: observing any aggressive behaviour during only one year 
did not allow to detect a large number of aggressions. This inevitably introduces 
the risk of Type II errors into analyses of the current study. 
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Other limitations consist of several relevant unevaluated aspects related to 
metacognitive functioning and aggressive behaviour, such as child maltreatment, 
psychopathy, neuropsychological features, monitoring of alcohol and substance 
use and other significant life events during one-year follow-up. 
Moreover, the very heterogeneous sample, while important for the 
observation and the ecology of the project, it could also have brought many 
potential confounding factors. Indeed, patients were both outpatients and 
inpatients, had different diagnoses and very different lengths of disease, etc. 
Obviously, all these variables have been analysed and did not present 
confounding factors, but it is plausible that the numerous elements present in the 
sample’s characteristics produced results that are more difficult to interpret. For 
example, the two settings have inherently different risk and protective factors. 
Many risk factors for aggressive behaviour such as substance use, poor adherence 
to treatment and environmental stressors are more limited in a residential setting 
compared to an outpatient’s one.  
Nevertheless, the aim of the current study was to identify the relationship 
between metacognition and aggressive behaviour, considering metacognition as 
an underneath variable of many other clinical, environmental and personal 
aspects. Furthermore, this is the first study that analyses metacognitive functions 
both in relation to the longitudinal observation of aggressive behaviour and in 
relation to the type of aggressiveness (verbal, against object, against people, self-
aggression). 
Another limitation might consist in the intrinsic difficulty of evaluating 
metacognitive functions, due to difficulties both in eliciting them and in 
interpreting data. The semi-structured interview, like the MAI, is the most 
effective instrument, as it is sufficiently flexible; on the contrary, self-report 
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measures might be inadequate because they are not capable of eliciting 
metacognitive functions in patients with compromised metacognition.  
However, the interview (MAI) needs a more accurate validation and a deep 
analysis of the theoretical model related to the 4 metacognitive functions is 
required to define them more specifically. The model splits the 4 functions into 
two domains: the Self domain, including Monitoring and Integrating, and the 
Other domain, including Differentiating and Decentring. In the Self domain, 
Integrating in particular concerns the ability to integrate elements and 
explanations not only of one’s own but also of others’ behaviour (but this aspect is 
incorporated in Decentring). In the same way, in the Other domain, Differentiating 
in particular also contains elements that concern one’s own ability to distinguish 
between sensory perceptions and thoughts. Finally, the MAI does not include a 
specific evaluation (and specific score) of the Mastery domain (which was present 
in previous versions of the instrument), which refers to the ability to use all 
information about the mental states of oneself and others in order to solve social 
problems and realise one’s own goals. 
For these reasons, further studies about both the theoretical model and 
evaluation tool are recommended. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CLINICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Violent behaviour of patients with mental disorders is a worldwide public 
health problem, which demands substantial amount of staff time and efforts for its 
management, and significantly contributes to increase the stigma of mental illness 
(Torrey, 2002). For these reasons it is important to investigate factors associated 
with the risk of offence in order to plan appropriate prevention and treatment. To 
realize these plans there is a need to understand what mechanisms and/or 
difficulties lead people with a mental disorder to commit aggressive behaviour. 
Only through the research of these mechanisms will it be possible to identify the 
critical dimensions that need to be treated to prevent violence. 
The VIORMED project aims at investigating a large set of correlates and 
predictors of aggressive behaviour in patients with severe mental disorders. This 
thesis therefore has focused on metacognitive functions. Indeed, there are three 
pathways that could lead metacognitive dysfunctions to violence (Semerari et al., 
2003a). 
First, the inability to recognize and interpret how one’s own mental states 
causes confusion about the self, one’s own fears, desires and goals (deficits in 
‘Monitoring’ and ‘Integrating’). This confusion implicates deficits in the ability to 
reason mental causality, e.g., how events trigger an emotion. This is mediated by 
cognitive interpretations about how behaviour is activated by cognition and its 
effects. When people lack the ability to understand what drives their reactions and 
behaviour, it is unlikely that their social functioning will be effective. Moreover, a 
person who fails to comprehend and elaborate what he/she feels and thinks could 
reflect it directly through action (which in some cases could be aggressive) as the 
only path of expression. 
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Second, the incapacity to recognize thoughts and emotions of others (i.e., 
deficits in ‘Differentiating’ and ‘Decentering’) more frequently means not actually 
understanding others’ behaviour and others’ points of view, which could lead to 
interpret other’s actions as always being addressed to themselves, as hostile and as 
threatening. In addition, the inability to consider one’s own ideas about 
interpersonal matters as subjectivity implies rigidity in interpretation of events 
and does not allow for a change of perspective based on incoming discrepant 
information. This condition may lead people to hold negative views of themselves 
and others without questioning them and make them unable to resolve conflict or 
agree on shared plans. Furthermore, the impairment of the ability to envisage 
others’ mental states might more probably cause harm to others, as this mental 
state information is what ordinarily inhibits harmful behaviour. 
Third, the incapability to integrate all mental state information about 
themselves and others to solve interpersonal problems (i.e., deficits in ‘mastery’ 
skills) could lead a person to have an absence or shortage of adaptive strategies 
and consequently, to use more primitive coping skills including aggression.  
It is evident that these metacognitive dysfunctions are closely linked to the 
risk of violence and constitute essential areas to be treated in order to avoid 
aggressive behaviour. Each patient may have certain deficits and not others 
because, as previously discussed, metacognitive functions are correlated but only 
partially independent. For this reason, it is important to have precise assessment 
measurements to identify compromised functions in order to plan effective 
personalized interventions to reduce the risk of violence. 
The prevention of aggressive behaviour, taking into account metacognitive 
functions, concerns two issues. On one hand, early identification of patients at 
high risk of aggressive behaviour through a precise evaluation of metacognitive 
dysfunctions, in order to successfully treat them and avoid violent acts. Deficits in 
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metacognition may also impair help-seeking in the first contact with Mental 
Health Services and this influences the Duration of Untreated Psychosis (DUP) 
phase (Macbeth et al., 2015). There is a known association between prolonged DUP 
and poorer outcomes (Penttilä, Jääskeläinen, Hirvonen, Isohanni, & Miettunen, 
2014). Also for this reason, early identification of patients with metacognitive 
dysfunction is essential to effectively treat them in a timely manner through 
metacognitive psychological treatment.  
On the other hand, the prevention of violent relapses in patients with a 
history of violence is a fundamental issue.  This current research demonstrates that 
patients with poor metacognitive functioning have a more frequently history of 
violence than patients with good metacognitive functioning and that in turn, the 
history of violence is a strong predictor of future aggressive behaviour. Thus, and 
in light of the association between metacognitive deficits and the risk of violence, it 
appears to be crucial to offer metacognitive psychological treatment to patients 
with a history of violence in order to try to effectively treat metacognitive deficits.  
According to clinical metacognitive approach of the Third Centre of 
Cognitive Psychotherapy (Carcione et al., 2008; Semerari et al., 2003a,b; 2007; 
2014), the therapist can help the patient by means of metacognitive psychological 
interventions in the following processes: (a) to recognize and elaborate one’s own 
internal states, both cognitive and emotional, giving personal meaning; (b) to 
understand what he/she fears and at the same time what he/she wants to achieve 
in a certain situation; (c) to express one’s own thoughts, emotions, fears and 
desires in an adaptive and functional way for his/her self and for his/her society; 
(d) to integrate all this information into personal and continuous experience in 
which the patient recognizes him/herself and consequently, to implement an 
adaptive and consistent behaviour with this representation; (e) to distinguish 
between internal reality, constituted by thoughts, images, dreams and an external 
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reality, detected through senses; (f) to consider one's own point of view as 
subjective and debatable, and not as absolute and universal for everyone; (g) to 
build other’s point of view, through recognition (or at least the hypothesis) of 
thoughts and emotions of others and integrate this information into coherent and 
complex representations concerning others; (h) finally, to use all the above 
information to guide behaviour towards personal goals, to resolve any relational 
problems in a functional way for the patient and society (thus peacefully and 
respectfully).  
Certain studies already support the need for treatment addressing 
metacognitive abilities to improve the psychosocial outcomes of patients with 
severe mental disorders (Bargenquast & Schweitzer, 2014; Bateman & Fonagy, 
2008a; Briki et al, 2014; Carcione et al., 2011; Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015; Eichner & 
Berna, 2016; Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015; Lysaker et al., 2011c, 2015c; Moritz et al., 
2014; Salvatore et al., 2012), and in particular, of patients with mental disorders 
and a history of violence (Bateman & Fonagy, 2008b).  
Bo and colleagues (2015) in their study about patients with schizophrenia 
and criminal history, suggested that treatment focused on the functional level of 
metacognition could reduce delusions and strengthen social functioning. 
Therefore, they underline the importance of intervention designed to enhance 
patients' metacognitive abilities, as the more proximal abilities linked to social 
functioning. Bateman and Fonagy (2016) in recent research on patients with 
antisocial personality disorder (and comorbidity with borderline disorder), also 
found that measures of negative mood and general psychiatric symptoms showed 
significant improvement and better adjustment following the Mentalization Based 
Treatment (MBT). Similarly, common sequels of aggression such as poor general 
functioning, interpersonal problems and social adjustment at the end of treatment 
were improved as a result of the MBT compared with control patients.  
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These findings demonstrated that despite the variety of conceptual 
approaches, there is extensive agreement that individuals need to recognize their 
internal mental states in order to build constant and coherent self-representations. 
They must also understand others' mental states in order to establish and maintain 
adaptive and satisfying interpersonal relationships (Dimaggio & Stiles, 2007; 
Jorgensen, 2010).  
Aggressive behaviour can be considered one of the worst outcomes of poor 
psychosocial functioning, perhaps the most important outcome to be avoided as it 
damages others. For this reason and considering that research in this field is still 
very limited and inhomogeneous (both in terms of theoretical approaches and 
evaluation measures), further studies are needed to deepen the role of 
metacognitive function (considering different sub-functions) in relation to 
aggressive behaviour (considering different types of aggression) and to investigate 
whether psychotherapy focused on metacognitive functions is effective to avoid 
and/or reduce interpersonal violence.  
Finally, the present research has a very significant socio-cultural impact, 
especially in light of the recent laws (n. 9/2012 and 81/2014) that set the deadline 
of 31 March 2015 for the gradual discharge of all patients from Forensic Mental 
Hospitals and their relocation to special high-security units, with no more than 20 
beds each. In addition, many patients at lower risk of re-offending, will be cared 
for by ordinary Mental Health Departments (DMHs). This change will involve 
increasing legal responsibility of both individual psychiatrists and DMHs and will 
also require a substantial organizational change for mental health services 
compared to the past.  
The management of mentally ill offenders in the community is one of the 
great challenges imposed on community psychiatry. Violence by the mentally ill 
has a profound detrimental effect on public opinion, is associated with stigma and 
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discrimination and poses a great burden on family members (who are often 
victims of such violence) and on society.   
Given this radical change and given the paucity of Italian studies in this area, 
further research is needed to provide information about the evaluation, treatment 
and monitoring of patients with mental disorders with a history and/or a high risk 
of violence. Additional scientific evidences are essential to provide useful 
indications for planners and clinicians who have the relevant task of planning, 
developing and monitoring new care pathways for mentally ill offenders in Italy.   
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APPENDIX 1 
 
METACOGNITION ASSESSMENT INTERVIEW (MAI) 
 
 
DOMANDA: 
“Mi può raccontare l’episodio o la situazione interpersonale peggiore (che le ha causato più 
malessere), dal punto di vista psicologico, in cui si è trovato negli ultimi 6 mesi?” 
Possibilmente un episodio di natura relazionale, in cui cioè era coinvolta un’altra 
persona che lei conosce.  
 
 
Domanda 
ai
ut
o 
Commenti 
1  Riguardo a quello che mi ha appena raccontato (A). Cosa provava (C)?   
2  Quali erano le sue emozioni (C)? 
 
Se il soggetto riferisce solo una descrizione somatica es.“avevo il fiato corto; 
mi sudavano le mani” 
L’intervistatore può aiutarlo dicendo: 
ü Aiuto “provi a trovare un termine che identifichi queste sensazioni corporee” 
Se il soggetto non fornisce nessuna descrizione adeguata né con un termine 
né con una metafora congrua  
ü Aiuto “può dare un nome a ciò che ha provato? E’ più vicino alla rabbia, alla 
tristezza o…” l’intervistatore fornisce una serie di possibilità di emozioni di 
base per aiutare il soggetto 
 
  
3  E quale è stata la causa di queste emozioni? 
 
Se il soggetto riporta diverse emozioni. L’intervistatore deve concentrarsi su 
ciascuna in modo da valutare: 
ü Aiuto: se alcune emozioni possono risultare secondarie ad altre (ed es. mi 
sono vergognata per essermi arrabbiata in quel momento), se il soggetto 
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non chiarisce spontaneamente questi nessi, l’intervistatore deve chiedere 
di precisare la sequenza temporale in cui ha provato le diverse emozioni 
con domande del tipo: “qual è stata la successione nel tempo di queste 
emozioni? Qual è stata la prima? In che momento ha provato l’emozione______ 
(emozione riferita)? Domande di questo tipo sollecitano la funzione di 
relazione tra variabili. Per questa ragione, dopo aver indagato la sequenza 
temporale può essere utile anticipare qui la domanda successiva: “perché ha 
provato secondo lei proprio queste emozioni?” “cosa può avergliele suscitate?” 
ü Aiuto: Se la numerosità di emozioni riferite suggerisce una confusione da 
parte del soggetto rispetto a ciò che ha provato: “ ha fatto riferimento a 
diverse emozioni, qual era l’emozione principale secondo lei?”. La risposta a 
questa domanda pertiene già alla funzione dell’integrazione (vedi sotto). 
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto riporta solo descrizioni somatiche es.” mi sentivo un 
peso sul petto oppure mi veniva da piangere”, l’intervistatore può aiutarlo 
a definire l’emozione a partire dallo stato somatico con domande tipo “lei 
mi ha detto di aver percepito________(sensazione somatica percepita), questa 
sensazione secondo lei era più legata ad un’emozione di____________ oppure 
di___________(elenco di possibili emozioni di base legate allo stato somatico).  
 
4  Quali erano i suoi pensieri (B)? 
 
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto elenca una serie di pensieri, l’intervistatore deve 
porre la seguente domanda: ‘ha fatto riferimento a diversi pensieri, quali erano 
secondo lei quelli più rilevanti?’ 
ü  Aiuto: Se il soggetto riferisce di non aver pensato a nulla e di avere solo 
reagito sull’onda di un’emozione, l’intervistatore potrà aiutarlo dicendo: 
“provi a riflettere su cosa può aver pensato o a quale interpretazione si stava dando 
della situazione; è difficile non pensare proprio a nulla, agire senza che ci sia 
un’interpretazione di ciò che sta accadendo” 
Oppure: “dice di non aver pensato proprio a nulla. Ma è possibile che le sia passata 
per la mente almeno un’immagine di ciò che stava accadendo?” 
 
  
5  E quale è stata la causa di questi pensieri? 
 
ü Aiuto:	Se	il	soggetto	non	riconosce	alcuna	relazione	tra	pensieri	ed	emozioni	o	tra	
pensieri	 ed	 altri	 stati	mentali,	 l’intervistatore	 può	 dire:	 “ci	 pensi	 un	 attimo,	 nel	
momento	 in	cui	ha	pensato_____________	che	 	 sensazioni,	 immagini	o	pensieri	
ha	avuto?”		
ü Aiuto:	 Se	 il	 soggetto	 non	 riferisce	 nessun	 legame	 tra	 pensieri	 ed	 emozioni	
l’intervistatore	 può	 aggiungere:	 “ci	 pensi	 un	 attimo,	 nel	 momento	 in	 cui	 ha	
pensato___________	che		immagini			o	pensieri	hanno	accompagnato	questa	sua	
riflessione?”	
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6  Che cosa ha fatto (D)?   
7  Cosa l’ha spinta ad agire così? 
 
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto risponde in modo vago o poco attinente agli stati 
mentali descritti. L’intervistatore può specificare la domanda facendo 
esplicito riferimento al comportamento descritto: “Lei mi ha detto di aver 
reagito____________ (comportamento riferito) che cosa l’ha spinta ad agire così?. 
Sebbene la ripetizione della domanda possa sembrare una chiarificazione, 
essa viene valutata come aiuto dal momento che in questo modo 
l’intervistatore aiuta il soggetto a focalizzarsi in modo specifico sulla 
relazione che c’è tra stato interno e comportamento. 
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto continua a non riportare alcuna relazione tra il suo 
comportamento e gli stati interni l’intervistatore può aiutarlo ipotizzando 
alcune spiegazioni del comportamento in funzione degli stati interni; ad 
es. “lei mi ha detto di aver reagito rimanendo immobile, è stata la paura di 
peggiorare la situazione, l’imbarazzo di dover prendere la parola o….” 
 
  
8 Quindi, provando a riassumere l’episodio che mi ha appena raccontato; lei ha 
provato…, pensato…ed ha reagito…Qual era il suo obiettivo in quel 
momento, cioè quando ha (aggiungere D)? 
  
9  Cosa desiderava? E cosa temeva in quella situazione ? 
 
  
101 Quindi, ha detto di aver provato (emozione riferita-C).  
Quando è variato il suo stato d’animo? 
 
ü Aiuto: se il soggetto dice di non ricordare, l’intervistatore può dire: ‘Ci 
pensi un attimo, quanto è durato secondo lei quello stato d’animo (un’ora, un 
giorno etc…) cosa può averlo fatto variare secondo lei?’ 
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto non riferisce mutamenti dello stato interno, 
l’intervistatore lo può facilitarlo facendo riferimento, per esempio, alle 
emozioni o pensieri riportati precedentemente dal soggetto: “per esempio lei 
mi ha detto di aver inizialmente sentito un nodo alla gola e successivamente di 
essersi sentito molto deluso da sé stesso…quando secondo lei è passato dal nodo 
alla gola a…” . Oppure, se il soggetto riporta di pensare e provare le stesse 
cose rispetto alla specifica situazione descritta, l’intervistatore potrà 
suggerire: “tuttavia, sebbene nel momento in cui ripensa all’accaduto pensa e/o 
prova le stesse cose, immagino ci siano momenti in cui questi pensieri e stati 
d’animo siano meno presenti o sostituiti da altri pensieri e sensazioni.”  
ü Aiuto: se il soggetto non è in grado di individuare elementi interni o 
esterni che hanno contribuito alla variazione di stato, l’intervistatore può 
aiutarlo dicendo: “E’ stato secondo qualche evento o situazione esterna o è stato 
un suo processo interiore?” 
Se no: vai alla 13. 
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11  In che modo è variato?    
12  Cosa, secondo lei, lo ha fatto variare?   
13 Lei ha detto di aver pensato..(l’intervistatore si riferisce all’episodio 
raccontato). Quanto soggettivamente ci credeva, in quel momento, al 
pensiero che.. (pensiero riferito-B)? 
 
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto non comprende il senso della domanda, 
l’intervistatore può aiutarlo mettendo direttamente in relazione il pensiero 
con l’emozione provata: es. ‘Lei ha detto di aver provato rabbia verso i medici 
perché sua zia è morta ingiustamente. Quanto soggettivamente ci credeva in quel 
momento che fosse morta ingiustamente e quanto ha considerato altre possibilità?’  
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto continua a non vedere la possibilità di 
un’interpretazione alternativa dei fatti, l’intervistatore può aiutare il 
soggetto formulando lui stesso una nuova interpretazione dicendo: 
“secondo lei è ipotizzabile pensare che…”  
 
  
14 Se sì: Da uno a dieci quanto ci credeva?   
15 Erano possibili, a suo avviso, letture alternative dei fatti (rispetto al suo 
pensiero-B)? 
Se no: vai alla 16b 
 
  
16a Se sì: quali?   
17a Se sì: Cosa è mutato? 
 
  
18a Se sì: Cosa ha favorito questo cambiamento?   
19 Ripensandoci adesso c’è qualcosa che ha modificato il suo punto di vista    (B) 
rispetto a 6 mesi fa?  
  
16b Se no: Pensa che, in futuro, potrebbe modificare il suo punto di vista su 
quanto è successo? 
 
  
17b Se no: Cosa potrebbe spingerla a rivedere il suo punto di vista su quanto è 
successo? 
  
20 Durante l’episodio descritto, si sentiva per caso in uno stato di confusione, 
come in un sogno, o con un senso di irrealtà tale da non ricordare se un 
evento fosse realmente avvenuto o solo immaginato? 
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21 Le è mai capitato di avere questo stato di confusione, di sentirsi  
come in un sogno o come avvolto nella nebbia? 
Se no: vai alla 22 
  
21a Se sì: Le è capitato di immergersi in fantasie tali da perdere la  
nozione del tempo e il rapporto con il mondo reale? 
  
21b Se sì: Le è mai capitato di avere immagini o ricordi molto vividi che vive come 
se stessero accadendo realmente in quel momento?” Mi  
può fare degli esempi? 
  
21c Se sì: In questo momento sente la stessa confusione?   
22 Dunque lei si è trovato/a ad avere reazioni come____(indicare il 
comportamento descritto), a sperimentare emozioni come____o a 
pensare____.  
Le capita spesso di sentirsi/pensare/provare/fare cose di questo  
genere? 
L’intervistatore nel riassumere l’episodio del soggetto deve   
sintetizzare l’emozione prevalente e i pensieri e i  
comportamenti connessi all’emozione prevalente come  
individuato durante l’intervista sul monitoraggio (pensieri,  
emozioni e comportamenti) mostrandoli come uno stato  
mentale complessivo e potenzialmente ricorrente.   
 
ü Aiuto: se il soggetto si focalizza solo su un elemento del racconto, ad 
esempio sul comportamento agito, l’intervistatore può riprendere la 
domanda dicendo: “intendo però non solo situazioni in cui________, ma 
in cui ha anche provato emozioni e pensieri simili a quelli che mi ha 
raccontato….”   
  
  
23a Se sì: Come mai ha questo modo tipico? 
 
  
24a Le sarà però capitato di reagire in maniera diversa, cioè con emozioni e 
pensieri diversi, a circostanze come quelle che ha descritto. Ricorda 
qualche episodio in cui questo è accaduto, cioè una circostanza dove 
pensava che.. (e metti la B) o che provava.. (E) o che ha reagito..(D)? 
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Potrebbe provare a descrivere questo episodio? [le circostanze possono 
essere sempre rappresentate anche dal modo di sentirsi e/o di pesare e/o di 
comportarsi del pz] 
 
Importante per la funzione di integrazione. 
(Se più critico emotivamente o comunque la terza persona coinvolta è meglio 
conosciuta rispetto a quella coinvolta nell’episodio riferito all’inizio, usare 
questo nuovo episodio per il decentramento).  
 
Se no:  vai a 23b 
25a Quindi a volte reagisce ____(primo esempio_l’intervistatore  
qui riassume lo stato tipico del soggetto ovvero 
pensieri/emozioni/comportamenti , usando una terminologia  
più vicina possibile a quella dell’intervistato stesso), mentre altre  
volte reagisce____(episodio due_ l’intervistatore riassume qui  
il nuovo racconto ottenuto con la domanda). Da che cosa  
dipende secondo lei la differenza? 
 
  
26 a Come mai, secondo lei, aveva reagito nel primo modo?  
Come mai, secondo lei, aveva reagito nel secondo modo? 
 
ü Aiuto. Se il soggetto fa fatica a fornire un confronto plausibile, 
l’intervistatore può aiutare il soggetto dicendo: “in tutte queste circostanze 
cosa c’è in comune nel suo stato d’animo e nel suo modo di pensare?” 
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto fa fatica a fornire un confronto plausibile, 
l’intervistatore può aiutare il soggetto dicendo: “che differenza c’è secondo lei 
tra quando_______ (riferimento a stati interni riportati in un episodio) e 
quando___________ (riferimento a stati interni riportati in secondo episodio)?” 
ü Aiuto. Se il soggetto fa fatica a fornire una spiegazione della transizione tra 
stati mentali, l’intervistatore può aiutare il soggetto dicendo: “Che cosa le 
permette, secondo lei, di passare da…(stato interno) a (secondo stato interno)?” 
Vai alla 27 
  
23 b Se no: “Le viene in mente un suo tipico modo di reagire a circostanze difficili? 
Se sì: vai alla 24b 
 
  
24 b Se sì: Come ha reagito in quel momento? 
Che emozioni ha provato in quelle altre circostanze? 
Che pensieri? 
Vai alla 25b 
  
23 c Se no:  ripetere domanda 22. 
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25 b Quindi a volte reagisce____(primo esempio_l’intervistatore  
qui riassume lo stato tipico del soggetto, usando una terminologia  
più vicina possibile a quella dell’intervistato stesso), mentre altre  
volte reagisce____(episodio due_ l’intervistatore riassume qui  
il nuovo racconto ottenuto con la domanda). Da che cosa  
dipende secondo lei la differenza? 
 
  
26 b Come mai, secondo lei, aveva reagito nel primo modo?  
Come mai, secondo lei, aveva reagito nel secondo modo? 
 
ü Aiuto. Se il soggetto fa fatica a fornire un confronto plausibile, 
l’intervistatore può aiutare il soggetto dicendo: “in tutte queste circostanze 
cosa c’è in comune nel suo stato d’animo e nel suo modo di pensare?” 
ü Aiuto: Se il soggetto fa fatica a fornire un confronto plausibile, 
l’intervistatore può aiutare il soggetto dicendo: “che differenza c’è secondo lei 
tra quando__________  (riferimento a stati interni riportati in un episodio) e 
quando__________ (riferimento a stati interni riportati in secondo episodio)?” 
ü Aiuto. Se il soggetto fa fatica a fornire una spiegazione della transizione tra 
stati mentali, l’intervistatore può aiutare il soggetto dicendo: “Che cosa le 
permette, secondo lei, di passare da_______c(stato interno) a__________ (secondo 
stato interno)?”. 
 
  
27 Mi ha detto che ____ (nominare il personaggio del racconto) ha avuto un 
ruolo importante in questa storia. Vorrei che provasse a mettersi dal suo 
punto di vista. 
Secondo lei come ha vissuto l’episodio (emotivamente) l’altra  
persona?  
 
ü Aiuto “vorrei che lei si focalizzasse sui pensieri e le emozioni che l’altro può aver 
provato in quella specifica circostanza, e non in generale”. 
 
  
28 Che emozioni avrà provato? 
ü Aiuto “può dare un nome a ciò che potrebbe aver provato (nome dell’altro) ? E’ 
più vicino alla rabbia, alla tristezza o…” l’intervistatore fornisce una serie di 
possibilità di emozioni di base per aiutare il soggetto. 
ü Aiuto “Dato il modo di pensare e di comportarsi di (nome dell’altro), come 
potrebbe sentirsi di fronte ad una cosa del genere?”.  
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29 Perché ha provato quel tipo di emozione? Da che cosa lo ha dedotto?   
30  Che cosa avrà pensato?   
31 Perché, secondo lei, ha pensato in quel modo? Che ragioni aveva?   
32 Per come lo conosce è tipico di____(nome del personaggio)  
pensare e sentire in quel modo? 
 
  
32 a Se sì: perché ha questo modo tipico di reagire?   
33 a Mi può fare un altro breve esempio di quando questa persona che conosce ha 
provato, sentito e si è comportato nello stesso modo? 
 
ü Aiuto. Se il soggetto fornisce spiegazioni degli stati mentali altrui che 
risultano incongruenti, inverosimili o generici rispetto all’episodio narrato, 
l’intervistatore può fornire un aiuto mettendo in luce l’implausibilità della 
spiegazione fornita: “Mi scusi mi faccia capire meglio, prima mi ha detto che 
(nome dell’altro) ha agito (dicendo, facendo, essendo nella condizione di) e che 
questo ha avuto…(effetto ottenuto e incongruente rispetto all’interpretazione 
fornita), ora però mi descrive (nome dell’altro) come una persona che….come si 
conciliano questi due aspetti di (…) o cosa spiega, secondo lei, questa diversità ?” 
 
  
32 b Se no:  perché è stato diverso? 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Adjusted Models 
 
FEEL  
Dependent variable: FEEL Sadness 
 Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 112.673 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) 6.109 1 .013 
Age .018 1 .892 
Disorder duration  1.021 1 .312 
 
Dependent variable: FEEL Disgust 
 Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 615.265 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) .059 1 .808 
Disorder duration  2.930 1 .087 
 
Dependent variable: FEEL Fear 
 Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 128.613 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) .518 1 .472 
Age 2.412 1 .120 
 
Dependent variable: FEEL Total 
 Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 2863.434 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) 6.435 1 .011 
Age .630 1 .428 
Disorder duration  1.043 1 .307 
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BDHI  
Dependent variable: BDHI Assault 
 Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F p-value Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 30.805* 2 15.403 3.104 .047 .035 
Intercept 1973.760 1 1973.760 397.824 .000 .702 
Education level 26.099 1 26.099 5.261 .023 .030 
Group (PM vs GM) 1.471 1 1.471 .297 .587 .002 
Error 838.474 169 4.961       
Total 3356.000 172         
Corrected Total 869.279 171         
 
*R Squared = ,035 (Adjusted R Squared = ,024) 
 
 
Dependent variable: BDHI Suspicion 
 Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F p-value Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 39.210* 2 19.605 3.160 .045 .038 
Intercept 384.876 1 384.876 62.032 .000 .282 
Group (PM vs GM) .001 1 .001 .000 .991 .000 
Disorder duration  37.799 1 37.799 6.092 .015 .037 
Error 980.305 158 6.204    
Total 3951.000 161     
Corrected Total 1019.516 160     
 
*R Squared = ,035 (Adjusted R Squared = ,026) 
 
STAXI-2 
 
Dependent variable: STAXI-2 State Anger 
 Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 1467.516 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) 1.913 1 .167 
Age 5.135 1 .023 
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Dependent variable: STAXI-2 Feeling angry 
 Type III 
 Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 246.436 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) .627 1 .429 
Age 3.762 1 .052 
 
 
Dependent variable: STAXI-2 Trait Anger 
 Type III 
 Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 1360.329 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) .132 1 .716 
Age 14.807 1 .000 
Age of first contact 3.082 1 .079 
 
Dependent variable: STAXI-2 Angry Temperament 
 Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 261.542 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) .005 1 .946 
Age 7.769 1 .005 
Age of first contact 1.111 1 .292 
 
 
MOAS 
Dependent variable: MOAS Total 
 Type III 
 Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 60.956 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) .014 1 .905 
Age 5.463 1 .019 
Disorder duration .003 1 .960 
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Dependent variable: MOAS Verbal  
 Type III 
 Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 38.112 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) 1.465 1 .226 
Age 6.048 1 .014 
Disorder duration .088 1 .767 
 
 
Dependent variable: MOAS Against objects 
 Type III 
 Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 15.771 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) .444 1 .505 
Age 6.409 1 .011 
Age of first contact .046 1 .831 
 
 
Dependent variable: MOAS Against people 
 Type III 
 Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 6.102 1 .014 
Group (PM vs GM) .655 1 .418 
Age 1.472 1 .225 
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Models with interaction 
 
 Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 29.315 1 .000 
BDHI_Assault 10.175 1 .001 
Group (PM vs GM) 7.528 1 .006 
Group (PM vs GM) * BDHI_Assault 7.885 1 .005 
Age 4.067 1 .044 
Disorder duration .914 1 .339 
 
 
 Type III 
 Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 18.679 1 .000 
BDHI_Indirect Aggress. 14.676 1 .000 
Group (PM vs GM) 5.122 1 .024 
Group (PM vs GM) * BDHI_Indirect 
Aggress. 
5.671 1 .017 
Age 4.113 1 .043 
Disorder duration .514 1 .474 
 
 
 Type III 
 Wald Chi-Square df p-value 
(Intercept) 17.641 1 .000 
STAXI_Angry reaction 8.812 1 .003 
Group (PM vs GM) 7.820 1 .005 
Group (PM vs GM)* STAXI_Angry 
reaction 
6.322 1 .012 
Age 2.596 1 .107 
Disorder duration .273 1 .602 
 
 
